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This paper describes the ways in which EU law forces Member States to reorganise their welfare 
states, focusing on the effects of free movement and competition principles on health care, 
education, and social insurance. It then considers the consequences of such reorganisations for 
national identity and social cohesion, for domestic and foreign policy and European integration, 
and as the creation of a new welfare industry. 
 
The thesis of the first part is this: that the negative harmonisation of welfare services via judicial 
application of free movement rules is potentially further reaching than often realised, and 
difficult to reverse. As a result of changes in welfare provision many services are now provided 
‘for remuneration’. Moreover, legal, policy, and philosophical factors make it difficult to create a 
wholesale exemption for welfare. On the other hand, positive harmonisation remains politically 
unpopular and difficult to achieve, and at more than a very abstract framework level would 
probably be economically and organisationally undesirable too. Hence Europe is moving towards 
a continent-wide market for welfare services. 
 
The thesis of the second part, considering the consequences of such a development, is that this 
probably has far greater implications for national identity and social structure than it does for 
welfare itself. It is possible to achieve high quality universal welfare service provision in 
regulated markets, but the absence of the huge public or quasi-public institutions which are a part 
of European life will change the texture of society. This is potentially threatening to social 
cohesion, and also to the European sense of our place in the world, in which contrasts with the 
US, in which welfare states often play a role, are prominent. Any such changed sense of self 
could – indeed should – have wide-ranging effects on state behaviour, even extending to foreign 
policy. As well as this, the creation of a European market for welfare provides opportunities for 
deepening European integration and involving the EU in central aspects of individual life. 
Finally, welfare is potentially the world’s largest industry. However strange it may be to see it 
that way, privatising provision in Europe may create actors who can and will become global, 
perhaps using their expertise to help build welfare states around the world.  
 
                                                 
∗ Lecturer in European Law, University of Groningen. g.t.davies@rug.nl. I am grateful to Professor Ted Marmor and 
Professor Mattias Kumm for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the participants in the NYU 
School of Law seminar where this was first presented for their feedback and thoughts. I am also grateful to Professor 
Paul Nihoul for inviting me in the spring of 2005 to the University of Louvain to speak at a seminar on the EU and 
Health Policy. This paper builds on thoughts first publicly formulated there, and expressed in Davies ‘Welfare 
Services and the European State’, in Nihoul and Simon L’Europe et les soins de santé (Larcier, 2005) at 369. 





2. The Processes of Harmonisation………………………………………………....10 
 
3. Negative Harmonisation…………………………………………………….…...14 
3.1 Are Welfare Services Economic?....................................................................15 
3.2 Restrictions on Free Movement and Competition…………………………...23 
3.3 Do National Systems Count for Nothing? The Role of Justification….……..27 
 
4. Positive Harmonisation……………………………………………….………….39 
 
5. Rolling Back the Law: Prospects for a Legal Retreat from Welfare……….……42 
 
6. The Social Implications of Welfare Harmonisation: Welfare Patriotism and European 
National Identities………………………………………………………….…….46 
 
7. The Policy Implications of Welfare Harmonisation: Unemployed States and 
Opportunities for the EU…………………………………………………………53 
 









  5 
1. Introduction 
 
Membership of the European Union affects national welfare states. It is the contention here that 
it tends to result in (often monopolistic) national welfare-providing institutions being replaced by 
a diversity of private providers in an increasingly European market for welfare services; 
education, health care, and the different forms of social insurance. 
 
This process is much discussed, and is politically controversial. The European public’s 
complicated and nervous relationship with foreigners and markets – let alone individual freedom 
and diversity - makes such a liberalisation an inevitable object of attack. The primary criticism is 
that market provision will undermine solidarity. It is the welfare state itself which is seen as the 
threatened institution and protection from life’s ills as the object that citizens have to lose. 
 
This paper largely ignores that debate. It is not concerned with the relative functional merits of 
private and public provision, or whether privatisation should occur. Instead it aims to document 
the extent of the changes occurring, and to ask what their significance may be beyond welfare. 
What are the side effects of harmonisation? 
 
This focus arises from three perceptions. One is that EU law as it stands authorises a great deal 
more interference in welfare states than has yet occurred. The process is certainly underway, but 
the principles stated have a long way to go before they reach their limits.  
 
The second perception is that the greatest impact of this may not be on levels of welfare, but on 
broader social structure. While it should be possible, in principle, to provide high levels of 
services and protection to the population via private providers in a carefully regulated market, 
this will change what it feels like to live in Europe. The welfare state there is huge, and dominant 
in the lives of citizens and in national politics. This is not just another policy that is being 
tinkered with, but the core of the modern European state that is being systematically dismantled. 
 
Thirdly, it is striking to a lawyer in what an un-European way this process is occurring. In a 
continent that still believes in the planned society, and where deductive, centralised policy-
making is the norm, and the government of judges has been taboo for several hundred years, 
suddenly one of the most important areas of policy is being apparently handed over to the courts, 
and litigants. It is not legislation that is harmonising welfare states, but principles developed 
reactively, inductively, and out of individual situations, by the Court of Justice. In Europe, such a 
central area of social planning and state structure has never before been led by judges. Moreover, 
those judges are not even applying welfare law. They are using principles of economic liberty 
and regulation. Welfare reform is not being led by welfare policy at all. 
 
Putting these together is, more than anything else, surprising. The mood of angsty discontent in 
Europe, the constipated politics, suggest that nothing much is happening, and that this is the 
problem. Yet it is the suggestion here that quite a lot is happening, and more will be soon. There 
is some kind of great big un-European experiment with the state going on, and at the end of it the 
monolithic institutions developed after the second World War may be gone, and there will never 
have been any public decision to do this but it will have happened, and for better or for worse 
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there will be a new kind of order, in which it remains to be seen how strong or deep the social 
cohesion and national identities will be, and how governments and peoples will behave. 
 
The first sections of the paper describe the law, and its application to welfare services. They are, 
it is hoped, utterly conventional and non-controversial, and yet they do suggest a scope for 
economic law somewhat wider than is generally seen to be the case. They take, however naively, 
the judgments of the Court to represent the law and simply follow these through. They find that 
pretty much all of the services provided by welfare states could, if organised in the right way, fall 
within free movement and competition law, and that the number of them so-organised is 
considerable and will grow. 
 
Following this there is discussion of the stability of that law. Of course, in principle, the Court 
could change its mind, or the Member States could take legislative steps to remove welfare from 
the scope of EU law, or insulate it further from the effects. What are the difficulties involved in 
such a step? A consideration of these suggests that the law, despite its controversial status, may 
be difficult to fundamentally amend. An exclusion of welfare from principles of openness would 
both undermine the goals of the EU and create political and social tensions. Yet if welfare is to 
be open then the days of the dominant state provider are probably numbered; such institutions do 
not mix well with competition. 
 
Having suggested that some form of welfare market is very likely, the paper moves onto 
consideration of the consequences of this, social, political and economic. Inevitably, the most 
that can be done in this limited paper is to outline ideas and possible paths. There is no attempt to 
prove an empirical thesis. The aim of these sections is rather to indicate how welfare change 
relates to broader issues, and what some of the possible reactions to it could be. For the lawyer 
and lawmaker, it is important to see the law in its context, and look beyond its immediate 
functional effects. For the non-lawyer, considering social and political changes, it is important to 
know what contribution the law may make.  
 
Initially, the role of the welfare state in post-war identity and its importance to social cohesion 
are considered, before looking at possible institutional reactions to welfare fragmentation. How 
might the behaviour of the state, and of the EU, change in a European welfare market? Then, 
what does it mean for integration, and even for economic performance? 
 
For the state, the major change is from provision to regulation. It is suggested that this requires a 
different type of engagement with welfare, less manpower intensive, and in some ways more 
distant. Some ideas are put forward for how this might affect the character of domestic politics. 
For example: If European governments were no longer so busy with the management of welfare, 
what would they turn their minds to; foreign affairs? Could private provision of welfare release 
the state from this essentially introspective policy area and encourage it to take a more 
extroverted role in the world? Is the difference between the US and the European role in global 
management partly explainable in terms of the capacity and obligation of their governments to 
keep themselves usefully busy with domestic matters?  
 
The move from public provision to a regulated market also has implications for the EU itself and 
the integration process. It is the natural regulator of European markets, so an opening is provided 
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for EU involvement in this most politically important and sensitive of areas. Could this provide 
the path to the heart of the European citizen that has so long in vain been sought?  
 
Finally, if the welfare state is often seen by Europeans as a source of social strength, then its 
weaknesses are increasingly economic. Could privatising welfare rewrite a story about over-
expensive and bureaucratic public sectors as one about European dominance of what is 
potentially by far the world’s largest industry? 
 
The conclusion attempts, as they do, to bring all the above together and sketch a linking theme. 
The theme is that of opportunity arising from creative destruction. The dismantling of structures 
does not have to be the end of what they protect, but can be an opportunity to rebuild in a 
different way. Having rebuilt itself with remarkable success after its last great war, Europe also 
created social institutions and legal structures that would contain its own freedom; it tried to 
entrench its social-market democracies. Yet no people can contain itself for ever. The panic that 
Europe seems to be experiencing currently is partly a result of the awareness that it is in fact in 
control of its own destiny; that nothing forces it to be peaceful, tolerant, or redistributive. The 
fear is that released from the belief that constitutions and institutions guarantee this, the continent 
may lose its way and its soul. The opportunity arises because it may not; it may freely choose for 
the values that previously it believed were beyond question. The market may invite loss of 
solidarity, but the continent may choose not to let it go.  
 
What is chosen is often more beautiful than what is imposed. The big motivating idea behind this 
paper is that European integration, entailing the removal of national boundaries and limitations, 
is essentially a process of self-discovery for Europe, with all the risks that this entails. This paper 
on welfare harmonisation is part of what I hope will become a broader investigation of this 
theme. If it seems to be an incomplete thesis, and to address issues of which welfare is but a part, 
that is indeed the case. The hope is merely that a coherently bounded and manageable aspect of 
Europe’s greater self-exploration is described below. 
 
Premise: that private provision need not be bad provision 
 
One significant premise underlies the argument in this paper. It is that it is possible for private 
providers within a well-enough regulated market to provide good quality services, even in a 
sensitive area such as welfare. This is not a statement about the profit-motive or the relative 
moral status of private and public provision, but a narrowly functional point. Good healthcare, 
education and insurance can be provided to a population by institutions not owned by the state, 
but subject to regulation imposing certain obligations of equality and universality. 
 
For some this will be controversial, yet is should be noted that many European states already 
provide much of their welfare in this way. The role of private institutions in health care is 
significant, and dominant in some states. Private universities are common, and in some countries 
most schools are also independent, non-state owned bodies. Social insurance is often provided by 
non-public funds, and is perhaps one of the easiest things to privatise, as a relatively impersonal 
transaction. Of course, it may well be necessary to regulate strictly and impose obligations 
concerning the terms of provision in order to ensure adequate and universal cover, but the mere 
fact of public or private ownership need not be crucial to effective delivery of the service itself. 
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Moreover, private provision does not remove the capacity of the state to tax and redistribute in 
order to ensure access to those services. 
 
It is hoped that the premise, narrowly interpreted as above, and not as a broader political 
comment about the merits of private versus public, is acceptable, for it is central to the thesis of 
this paper. It is precisely the argument here that it is because private provision of welfare is 
functionally possible that it is difficult to prevent its expansion, and to stop the movement from 
public provision to private provision within a regulated and European market. Arguments that 
state monopolies are necessary for reasons of the quality of provision are not usually good 
arguments, and so will be difficult to sustain. Rather, the arguments for retaining state 
dominance are more subtle and complex, to do with identity and social cohesion, rather than the 
quality of the particular service in question. The major aim of this paper is to try and make those 
arguments explicit, to indicate how they might be evaluated – without taking a particular 
normative stance - and investigate how they might play a role in the future of the law. 
 
Disclaimer: the limits of this paper 
 
Describing a point of view without challenging it can often feel and read like endorsement. 
Writing this paper it often felt as if I was fighting in the corner of European patriots, free 
marketers, anti-Americans, and occasionally old-fashioned socialists. That is not my intention. 
This paper does not aim to judge Europe’s self-image or its integration process. In particular it 
does not express a view on whether EU law should apply to welfare. It merely surveys the 
arguments and the consequences. I take no side in the normative debates. 
 
I was also very aware of the risk of twisting differences of degree into differences of type. When 
contrasting markets and public welfare systems, and Europe and America, the temptation to 
over-simplify was there. I hope that I have managed to show the importance of the genuine 
differences to my argument, without slipping into polemic.   
 
The risk was heightened because I was often writing about public perception – which is not 
always nuanced or fair. Yet without acknowledgment of the prejudices of the people, and the 
stereotypes which they use to build their world view, it is difficult to analyse what their reaction 
to the changing world around them will be. Once again, my aim is not to endorse, or to criticise, 
but to describe. 
 
This limited ambition is the result of the complexity of the topic. The questions whether welfare 
provision should be privatised and liberalised, or whether it should be subject to EU law, involve 
many issues. One needs to consider how welfare is best delivered from the perspectives of 
efficiency and equality, upon which there is a vast public policy literature.1 However, one also 
needs to consider the needs and importance of European integration, and whether this provides a 
                                                 
1 An introduction to the issues can be found in e.g. Marmor Fads in Medical Care Management and Policy (Nuffield 
Trust, 2004); Ranade Markets and Healthcare (Addison Wesley Longman, 1998); Moschonos Education and 
Training in the EU (Ashgate, 1998); Johnson The Welfare State in Transition – The Theory and Practice of Welfare 
Pluralism (U Massachusetts Press, 1987). Robert Gorden University Centre for Public Policy and Management also 
runs an excellent and comprehensive website which includes discussion of policy issues relating to welfare and 
suggestions for further reading: www.2.rgu.ac.uk/publicpolicy/introduction/wstate.htm. 
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normative basis for harmonising welfare, or whether, contrarily, democratic or socio-cultural 
arguments justify not doing so. In the end, any conclusion depends on visions of Europe, of 
economics, of liberty and collectivity, of the nation, and on value judgments about the relative 
importance of these. It would be impossible to provide an argued conclusion on whether the 
process being described here is a good thing without arguing all of these aspects, which would be 
too much for one paper, perhaps for one lifetime. If I do have a normative position it is this: the 
question is too difficult to decide a priori. Free movement attracts me, as an enhancement of 
liberty, and as a reaction to nationalism, but it has risks. Let us proceed carefully in that direction 
and see if it makes us happier. 
 
Definitions: the dangerous language of markets 
 
This is an area where terminology carries much ideological baggage. A few words on some of 
the terms used may be useful. Firstly, when I speak of ‘markets’ I do not mean ‘absolutely free 
markets’. I am simply referring to a state in which providers compete with each other to some 
extent, and have a financial interest in their activities, to some extent. This is not the same as 
saying that they make a profit as such. Many non-profit-making bodies are nevertheless 
institutionally benefited by increased income, and actively seek it, as readers working in 
universities will know. I am also not suggesting that in markets ‘market forces’ prevail 
absolutely or that goods are allocated entirely by such forces or by ability to pay. That may 
happen when markets are not regulated to any great extent. However, a market can be very 
highly regulated, and weaker consumers can be protected, and it can still be a market in the sense 
that I am using the word. Hence talk of markets does not indicate, as such, an abandonment of 
‘non-market’ values. Whether such values are abandoned is a separable question, at least as a 
matter of logic, if arguably not as a matter of political reality, from whether a market exists. 
 
Somewhat similarly, by ‘liberalisation’ I refer to an increase in freedom to engage in an activity. 
In the context of welfare, this means increasing the possibilities for new actors to engage in 
provision of services. Once again, that is not, contrary to its use in much political discourse, a 
comment on the terms on which such provision is permitted. It is simply a contrast with a 
situation where only one, or a selected few, bodies are permitted to provide. 
 
When I refer to ‘public’ and ‘private’ I am on the whole using these words in their simplest 
possible way – referring to ownership by the state or by something or someone that is not the 
state. That is not to deny that lines are blurred, and that privately owned bodies can have values 
and behaviour that leads the public to view them as public (and vice versa). However, as with the 
other terms above, my aim to separate issues as much as possible and render debate transparent. 
Whether and when private and public bodies behave like each other is an interesting question 
which can only be clearly addressed if one begins by having a working definition of the 
difference between them. Similarly, whether private provision can ever be compatible with non-
market values is a question that can only be explored if the question of behaviour is separated 
from that of ownership and structure. If ‘markets’, ‘private’ and ‘liberalisation’ are used as 
shorthand for ‘unequal’, ‘exploitative’, and ‘abandonment of solidarity’ then clear discussion 
even of any genuine causal link becomes impossible. 
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Of course, for those theoreticians for whom the former ideas entail the latter not just as a matter 
of socio-political fact but as a matter of necessary logic this will be unsatisfactory. Then I am 
engaging in linguistic dishonesty. However, they will not be interested in this paper. It was part 
of the premise above that any link between the two groups is not conceptually inherent. ‘Market-
based provision’ does not mean ‘abandonment of the poor’. That leaves open whether in the 
medium or long term a de facto causal relationship is politically inevitable, an issue touched on 
in the text below.  
 
2. The Processes of Harmonisation 
 
The term ‘welfare’ is used here to cover the core services that are associated with the European 
welfare state. It is often used in a narrower sense, to refer to last-resort benefits, but here the 
broader use is convenient. The focus is on provision of health care, provision of education, and 
social insurance. This latter is understood to mean insurance against unemployment, sickness, 
long-term incapacity, and old-age. The important element of these insurances is that for many it 
would be impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to obtain them on a truly free market because 
the individuals concern represent bad-risks; they are too healthy for pensions or too sick or 
stubborn for medical or unemployment insurance. Hence states have systems involving 
compulsory participation, acceptance obligations on insurers, and cross-subsidy between 
participants, or subsidy from general taxation, to make the insurance available to all.2 
 
The view which is almost universally accepted in Europe is that in at least these three areas there 
should be universal availability of services and a high degree of equality; that the services that all 
individuals receive should be of the same standard, and ideally from the same institutions.3 In 
particular, it is seen as a fundamental aim of the state to ensure that those who are poor receive 
the same education and healthcare and security against social ills as those who are wealthy. A 
contrast is often made between ‘welfarist’ and ‘universalist’ conceptions of public assistance. 
The first sees this as limited to helping those who cannot help themselves and so often relies on 
means-testing. The second provides services and benefits to the entire population, irrespective of 
their financial position. European welfare states tend towards universalism, certainly in the 
services under discussion here. There may be means-tested contribution towards the cost of 
health insurance and education, but this tends to be marginal, and means-linked institutional 
access is almost unknown: there are no universities, and very few schools or hospitals, which are 
only accessible to the rich, and none that only accept the poor. 
 
                                                 
2 Hatzopoulos ‘Health Law and Policy: the Impact of the EU’ in de Burca EU Law and the Welfare State (OUP, 
2005) 111-119; Rice and Smith ‘Strategic Resource Allocation and Funding Decisions’ in Figueras, McKee, 
Mossialos and Saltman Funding Health Care: Options for Europe (Open University Press, 2002), at 250. For an 
excellent introduction to the policy and purpose of social insurance see Marmor and Mashaw ‘Understanding Social 
Insurance: Fairness, Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare’(2006) 25 Health 
Affairs 114, although note that privatisation is largely treated as entailing a transfer of risk to individuals, a position 
making sense within the context of the American reforms that the paper addresses, but not accepted in the text 
above. 
3 Hatzopoulos, ibid. Marcusson, Rossi, Engelmann, Martin, Knopf and Roscher ‘Constructing Europe? The 
Evolution of Nation-State Identities’ in Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener The Social Construction of Europe 
(Sage, 1999) at 101. 
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However, the systems for provision of these services vary widely.4 Some countries educate 
almost all their children and students in public institutions following standard national curricula. 
Others, such as the Netherlands, operate what is essentially a voucher system without vouchers; 
private schools provide more than half the nation’s school education and are reimbursed for each 
pupil at standard rates.5 The National Health Service in the UK is famously said to be the world’s 
third largest employer after the Indian railways and the Chinese army, and provides the 
overwhelming majority of the nation’s medical services freely to those turning up on its 
doorstep.6 In some other states medical care is provided almost entirely by private institutions, 
and the state achieves universality via regulation and intervention in medical insurance.7 Even in 
social insurance, the sector where the state tends to be the most widely dominant, there are some 
quasi-private or truly private actors. Private pension funds are no longer strange to many 
countries, and industry-sector organisations are often responsible for other forms of social 
insurance.8 These have a non-market character in the sense that they contain cross-subsidy and 
exist to serve their sector rather than any shareholders, but they are not formally public in 
character. Nevertheless, their goals and character mean that to their customers they seem like 
public institutions, and the state subsidy they often receive, often combined with state-like 
regulatory privileges granted them, justifies viewing them as state agents rather than autonomous 
private organs.9  
 
However, what all the systems share is a profoundly national character. Most obviously, they are 
created by national law, and their institutional scope is determined by the geographical and 
jurisdictional limits of the Member State. Moreover, welfare is also national on more pre-legal 
levels. The fundamental unit within which equality is measured, and the political unit within with 
the success of welfare is measured, are both the nation. Similarly, the redistributive territory 
remains the state; Europe does not yet have the means, and while regions may have some 
redistributive function it is usually contained, less significant than that of the nation as a whole, 
                                                 
4 Esping-Andersen The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (CUP, 1996); Bahle ‘The Changing Institutionalisation 
of Social Services in England and Wales, France and Germany: Is the Welfare State on the Retreat?’ (2003) Journal 
of European Social Policy 5; Kautto ‘Investing in Services in Western European Welfare States’ (2003) Journal of 
European Social Policy 53; Marcusson et al, ibid. 
5 Hofman, Hofman, Gray and Daly The Institutional Context of Educational Systems in Europe: A Cross-Country 
Comparison on Quality and Equality (Kluwer, 2004) provides an overview of European school systems. See also 
www.eurydice.org for further information on educational systems in Europe. On the Netherland system see Patrinos 
‘Private education provision and public finance. The Netherlands as a possible model’ (2002) occasional paper 
no.59, National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education, Teacher’s College, Columbia University, 
available at www.ncspe.org. 
6 The working of the NHS is explained on www.nhs.uk. 
7 Kemenade Health Care in Europe 1997 (Elsevier, 1997) provides an overview of European systems. 
8 www.esip.org, the European Social Insurance Platform, contains a wide range of information on the organisation 
of social insurance in Member States. See also Normand and Busse ‘Social Health Insurance Funding’ in Figueras, 
McKee, Mossialos and Saltman Funding Health Care: Options for Europe (Open University Press, 2002), at 
59;‘Voluntary Health Insurance’ in Mossialos and McKee EU Law and the Social Character of Health Care (Peter 
Lang, 2002). 
9 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1991] ECR I-4837; Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-411/98 Ferlini [2000] 
ECR I-8081; C-266/87 Royal Pharmaceutical Society [1989] ECR I-1295; Temple Lang ‘Privatisation of Social 
Welfare: European Union Competition Law Rules’ in Dougan and Spaventa Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2003) 45, at 74. 
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and indeed may be parasitic on this; regions may be distributing nationally collected funds, via 
central subsidy to local government.10 
 
Another shared aspect is complexity. From the consumer perspective there may at times be 
simplicity. Indeed, the capacity of the citizen to know their welfare rights, what they may 
receive, and how to obtain it, is part of public attachment to national structures, the contrast 
being with the chaos of the market.11 Still, simplicity is hard work, and front-end transparency 
rests on a superstructure of regulation commonly forming a significant part of the total law of the 
land, and an administrative and provisory apparatus that is typically the largest part of the state 
and consumes the majority of its budget.12 Inevitably, in such a structure the parts of the machine 
are interlinked and interdependent, and tinkering with one small cog may have much wider 
repercussions. 
 
Enter the EU. Of all its aims the one which has until now had the greatest impact on the lives of 
Europeans, and which is perhaps most closely tied to the ideological basis of integration, is that 
of removing the borders between Member States, and achieving an area of free movement.13 A 
small bundle of ideas, primarily that private movement between states (of goods, persons, 
services and capital14) should not be obstructed by public bodies, that discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality should not occur,15 and that the competition resulting from free movement 
should be fair,16 have not only reshaped European economies and societies but also acquired a 
constitution-like moral and legal status.17 Free movement and consequent fair treatment have 
become individual European rights.18   
 
There are two mechanisms by which free movement can cause changes to occur in national 
welfare systems. They are conventionally called positive and negative harmonisation.19 The first 
consists of the making of new rules concerning welfare at the EU level; replacement of national 
legislation by European. The second consists of the application of more general principles of EU 
                                                 
10 Some details may be found in ‘Limits of local taxation, financial equalisation, and methods for calculating general 
grants’ Report no.65 in the Council of Europe series Local and Regional Authorities in Europe, (Council of Europe 
Publishing, 1998) available from www.coe.int. 
11 See Baldock ‘On being a welfare consumer in a consumer society’ (2003) 2 Social Policy and Society 65 at 67, 
and his derivation of a similar idea from Foucault. 
12 See part 8 ‘The Economic Consequences of Welfare Harmonisation’, below, for details. 
13 Articles 2 and 14 EC. 
14 Articles 18, 28, 39, 43, 49 and 56 EC are the most important. 
15 Article 12 EC; ibid. 
16 Article 3 EC; Article 95 EC. 
17 Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195; Bickel and Franz Case C-274/96 [1998] ECR I-7637; Case C-85/96 
Martinez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] 
ECR I-1163; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I5659; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119. 
18 Reich ‘A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law’ 
(1997) 2 European Law Journal 131. 
19 Some prefer not to use the term ‘harmonisation’ for the negative process, as this assimilation of the negative to the 
positive seems to gloss the essential differences between a democratic legislative process, and the judicial 
application of free movement rules. However, both consist of the imposition of a single Community rule which 
overrules any national laws which may conflict with it, and solves the particular problems arising from differences 
between those national laws. The process and generality of positive and negative may be importantly different, but 
their essential function, for which they are named, is the same. 
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law in lawsuits brought by individuals, challenging aspects of national law which they claim 
conflict with EU-granted rights.  
 
The current position with respect to both types of harmonisation is this; the Court has laid down 
principles which go a great deal further than the actual cases have realised. The law exists in a 
strange state of unfulfilled potential.20 On the one hand, the cases suggest, indeed entail, that 
both positive and negative harmonisation of many, perhaps most, of the structures of welfare 
provision have a sound legal base. On the other hand, harmonisation has not happened to any 
significant extent yet, and the possibility is generally denied in official documents. The 
prevailing governmental and institutional position is that most welfare has a social character, and 
is not subject to economic law.21 
 
When the cases say the law is one thing and the government says it is another, one should be 
wary of the latter. It is certainly true that the state can make laws undoing judgments, and that 
courts may even react themselves to changing public and legal opinion. However, there is also a 
good chance that some bluffing is going on; if we deny it strongly enough, perhaps the potential 
litigants at least will believe us.22 When the law is of a radical and fast-moving character, as EU 
law is, there is also always the risk that the ideas and principles just haven’t been fully absorbed 
yet. States can’t quite believe some of the things that the EU has forced them to do, and it has 
often taken decades for a fairly clear principle to be fully internalised.23 On top of that, the 
strange politics of EU integration means that governments often reject in public what they agree 
to in private. For domestic public consumption they decry measures intruding on national 
competence, while in Brussels, for complex reasons including a cooler-headed awareness that the 
measures are necessary, they agree to them.  
 
The apparent battle between law-maker and adjudicator is thus not over, nor are contradictions 
within the law resolved. It may be that the Court will change its tune, or the Member States will 
change the Treaty, or neuter it with secondary legislation. However, given the power of the Court 
to steer the law, and the fact that it has been fairly consistent until now, and that it has often been 
radical in the past, it is at least worth considering the possibility that it means what it says and 





                                                 
20 This is perhaps not so strange. Laying down broad principles which are then slowly, perhaps over decades, 
realized and enforced in the Member States is a common Court of Justice technique. See Hartley Foundations of EC 
Law (4th edn. OUP, 1999) at 79. Precisely because obedience to the law is relatively low, or at least often delayed, it 
becomes possible to sneak surprisingly radical principles into the case law. By the time Member States realize their 
implications - because national authorities are at last beginning to apply them, or the Court of Justice is using them 
more often and more widely - they have been around long enough to seem established. 
21 See the Commission Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2003)270 final; Commission White 
Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2004)374 final. 
22 Martinsen ‘The Europeanization of Welfare – The Domestic Impact of Intra-European Social Security’ (2005) 43 
Journal of Common Market Studies. 
23 See the account of national court reactions to supremacy and direct effect in Craig and de Burca, EU Law (3rd edn, 
OUP, 2003) at 285-315. Also, Alter The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe: Establishing the 
Supremacy of European Law (OUP, 2001). 
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3. Negative Harmonisation of Welfare 
 
EU law requires that companies or individuals who wish to provide or receive economic services 
be free to do so, on a temporary or permanent basis, in all states of the Union.24 Unjustified 
obstacles to cross-border provision or receipt of services, or to establishment in a Member State, 
are prohibited, and national judges are empowered and required to set aside national measures 
conflicting with these principles, at the suit of an affected party.25 A lawsuit of this type is 
always built around a simple three-stage analytic structure: first, is the service involved 
‘economic’? Second, is there a restriction on the cross-border provision of this service – an 
obstacle to free movement in common lawyer’s parlance. Third, is that obstacle justified by some 
legitimate goal and proportionate to its goal? If so, it may remain. If not, it is unlawful. The 
major impact of the EU on welfare to date arises from the application of these principles.  
 
A secondary impact arises from competition law. In general the rules concerning competition 
and state aids apply to the behaviour of market actors, and come into their own once the move to 
a competitive state has been made.26 It is free movement which requires the initial entry and exit 
of provider and recipient to be possible, and so brings about that transition. However, 
competition law also prohibits regulation protecting behaviour that would be anti-competitive 
were it engaged in by market participants acting freely.27 For this situation to occur there are 
three requirements; for competition law to apply there must be an undertaking, which is an 
organisation acting in an ‘economic’ way. Then there must be a public measure protecting, 
encouraging or reinforcing behaviour by an undertaking or undertakings which is anti-
competitive. Finally, there must be an absence of adequate justification for that measure.28 As 
can be seen, the structure of the analysis is similar to that of a free movement case. However, the 
scope of application of competition to public measures is much narrower. If the state provides by 
law that hospitals may co-ordinate and fix prices or allocate patients to each other, then 
competition is engaged. However if the state fixes prices, or provides rules determining where 
patients will be treated, then it is not. Such rules will have much the same protectionist effect, but 
are seen as free movement matters. Any challenge to them must be made on the basis that they 
tend to protect existing providers and exclude new ones, and thus make it harder for foreign 
providers to enter the market.  
 
In certain contexts within the welfare state legal protection of anti-competitive behaviour is of 
great importance. Laws may grant the professions the power to regulate themselves and their 
                                                 
24 Articles 43 and 49 EC. 
25 Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 1141; Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1; e.g. Case C-33/74 Van 
Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299. 
26 See generally Buendia Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies under EC Law: Article 86 
(former Article 90) of the EC Treaty (OUP, Oxford, 1999); Blum and Logue State Monopolies under EC Law 
(Wiley, 1998); Lang, n 9 above; Biondi and Rubini ‘Aims, Effects and Justifications: EC State Aid Law and its 
Impact on National Social Policies’, in Dougan and Spaventa, n 9 above; Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing National Health 
Systems but Healing Patients’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 714 et seq; ‘EU Competition Law and 
Health Care Systems’ in Mossialos and McKee, n 8 above; Karl ‘Competition Law and Health Care Systems’ in 
McKee, Mossialos and Baeten (eds) The Impact of EU Law on Health Care Systems (Peter Lang, 2002); Buendia 
Sierra and Hancher ‘Cross-Subsidization and EC Law’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 901. 
27 Articles 81 and 82 in conjunction with Article 10 EC; Case 13/77 G.B. INNO [1977] ECR 2115; Case 267/86 Van 
Eycke [1988] ECR 4769; Case C-140/94 Chiogga [1995] ECR I3257. See Lang, n 9 above, at 50-65. 
28 Article 81(3); Article 86(2); See Lang, ibid. 
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activities, and it may, of most relevance here, grant powers to non-state collective insurance 
funds, for example enabling them to require compulsory affiliation from all members of a 
profession or industry sector. The application of competition law to public measures is therefore 
considered below. However, the emphasis is on free movement, as the primary governor of law 
and regulation. This paper is above all concerned with the transition to competition, and with the 
legal structure of the welfare state. Once that structure has changed to a market-based one, 
another story begins. 
 
The sections below deal with the three steps of negative harmonisation: application, the finding 
of a restriction, and justification. The most important of these is the first. Including welfare 
within economic law is a paradigm change for both European states and European integration. 
Whether or not the legal consequences of that inclusion follow the analysis here, it is a safe bet 
that they will be significant. Welfare and free movement cannot mix without major revisions to 
the principles presently underlying one or both. 
 
3.1 ARE WELFARE SERVICES ECONOMIC? 
 
To fall within the scope of free movement law a service must normally29 be provided ‘for 
remuneration’.30 ‘Remuneration’ is understood by the Court to mean a consideration-like 
payment,31 but does not have to be from the party receiving the service.32 Importantly, it does not 
matter who provides it, so long as the service provider can be said to be paid for their work.33 To 
be an ‘undertaking’ for competition law purposes an entity must be engaged in an activity which 
is, or could be, performed on a competitive market.34 
 
Emphasis on the transaction 
 
In deciding whether these requirements are satisfied the emphasis in both cases is on the 
transaction or activity in question rather than the entity.35 A public authority will in general not 
be an undertaking, but may act as one in certain circumstances (auctioning used vehicles, for 
example), and may offer certain services which are not for remuneration (clearing public 
                                                 
29 The role of the word ‘normally’ remains unclear. It could apply to the individual service or institution, and be 
intended to deal with the situation of special offers or discounts. Alternatively it could apply to the ‘type’ of service, 
and ensure that once a sector was brought within the law all institutions, even the charitable or public, would be 
dealt with equally. This last interpretation would however be radical; it would mean that liberalization in one state, 
or partial free-market provision within the state, would ‘suck’ non-economic providers into the internal market too. 
Hence even non-economic services might be caught. The caught has never directly addressed the meaning of 
‘normally’ but there is no suggestion of the radical second meaning in its discussions, with each institution or 
service being brought within the law being individually categorized as ‘economic’. 
30 Article 50 EC. 
31 Case C-236/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. 
32 Case C-352/85 Bond van Adverteerders [1988] ECR 2085; Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] 
ECR I-5473; Koutrakos ‘Healthcare as an Economic Service under EC Law’ in Dougan and Spaventa, n 9 above, 
105 at 113. 
33 Koutrakos, ibid, at 115. 
34 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elsner [1991] ECR I-1979; Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751; Opinion of the 
Advocate General in Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691 at para 38; Jones and Sufrin EC Competition Law (2nd 
edn. OUP, 2004) at 107; Karl, n 26 above at 167. 
35 Davies ‘Competition, Free Movement and Consumers of Public Services’ (2006) 17 European Business Law 
Review 95. 
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highways, freely done, advising on benefits and rights), and others which perhaps are (rodent-
killing, for a price).36 
 
In substance both requirements are the same. An entity providing services for payment is 
inevitably doing something that could be done on a market, and so is acting as an undertaking. 
An entity acting as an undertaking is inevitably being paid for its services. The contrast, in both 
cases, is therefore with the situation where a body provides services funded from its own wealth 
(rare, unless it is the state, on which there is more said below), or where the flow of money 
between source and service provider is so imprecisely linked to the services performed that there 
cannot be said to be ‘payment’. This can occur when there is an open-ended promise of subsidy, 
or a guarantee of support for an institution. 
 
The difference between this latter situation and payment is this; a payment for services is a 
market-like transaction, even if it does not in fact take place in a competitive context; as a 
defined exchange of value it is the sort of transaction that could. For example, other providers 
might wish to compete for the payment. The substantive question underlying both the free 
movement and competition application conditions is therefore whether a market-ready 
transaction is taking place.37 If so, the law requires those transactions to be subject to market 
disciplines of openness and fairness.38 By contrast, if there is no market-ready exchange, then 
market law simply does not apply. Payment is the evidence that a market-ready transaction is in 
fact occurring.  
 
The first step towards liberalisation is therefore in the hands of states. However, once they do 
create a proto-market, a welfare system in which market-like transactions take place and there is 
the structural potential for competition and choice, economic law will pick up that ball and run 
with it, creating opportunities for everyone to share in those choices and to compete. 
 
For convenience, services falling within free movement and competition law are conventionally 
referred to as ‘economic’ services, while ‘non-economic’ services fall without. 
 
In deciding whether money flows constitute payment two factors stand out. These are the degree 
of separation of the paying and providing entities, and the directness and precision of the link 
between payment and service provided.39 These two factors help identify a defined exchange of 
value. Other factors, such as the degree of subsidy involved, and the ‘character’ of the service are 
often mentioned as relevant but do not in themselves appear to be significant. A brief 
consideration of the situations which arise will demonstrate this.40 
 
                                                 
36 Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-475/99 Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089 at para 72; Case C-41/90 Höfner 
and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979; Geraets-Smits, n 32 above; Jones and Sufrin, n 34 above, at 110-112. 
37 Davies ‘Welfare as a Service’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27; See also Mossialos and McKee, 
n 8 above, at 166. 
38 Ibid 
39 Davies ‘Welfare as a Service’ n 37 above. 
40 For a similar schematic analysis of these situations see Bernard ‘Between a Rock and a Soft Place: Internal 
Market Versus Open Co-Ordination in EU Social Welfare Law’ in Dougan and Spaventa, n 9 above, 261. 
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Where transactions take place without the involvement of the state, for example where a private 
insurance company pays a hospital, or an individual pays an educational establishment, it is 
uncontroversial that services are being provided for payment.  
Even where the state is involved on one side of the transaction the same generally applies. If the 
state sells its services to the public (unusual) or pays private organisations to provide services to 
it or to individual citizens (more common) there is usually no doubt about remuneration. It takes 
only one party to a transaction to be commercial in behaviour to characterise the transaction as 
such. 
 
The troublesome situations are (i) the situation where the service provider, although formally 
private, is of an almost public character, and behaves in a non-commercial way, and (ii) where 
both payer and provider are public.  
 
An example of the first situation is a collective social fund responsible for a particular industry – 
say the teachers’ pension and insurance fund. This is likely to have compulsory contribution 
from all teachers, and be responsible for various forms of social insurance for them. The Court 
has at times found such funds to be undertakings, and at times not.41 In the former cases the 
funds were found to be operated according to a principle of ‘solidarity’ and to have an essentially 
‘social’ character. 42 In other cases, by contrast, they were undertakings, but the Court prevented 
the full force of competition law taking effect by granting derogations based on their social 
importance.43 
 
The social and non-economic character of the funds was supported by the Court by reference to 
many reasons, from an absence of profit motive to their social importance. All of these reasons 
have been consistently rejected as a basis for exclusion from the internal market in other cases, 
and should be treated as mere rhetoric44 – particularly since they were equally applicable to the 
other funds, which were undertakings. What appeared to be more important – it was the factor 
that made it through to the operative part of the judgments - was whether the funds were self-
sustaining (operated according to the principle of capitalisation, in the words of the Court) or 
received external subsidy, either from the state directly or via a system whereby social funds 
transferred money to each other to make up shortfalls or assist with financial difficulties.45 This 
was the sole concrete factor which distinguished those funds found to be undertakings from those 
found not to be.46  
 
 
                                                 
41 See Barnard ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity’ in Dougan and Spaventa, n 9 above, 157 at 164; 
Boni and Manzini ‘National Social Legislation and EC Antitrust Law’ (2001) 24 World Competition 239. 
42 Case C-159/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637; Case C-70/96 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395; Case C-264/01 
AOK [2004] ECR I-2493; Case C-115/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025; C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-
6021; Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691. 
43 Case C-244/94 FFSA [1995] ECR I-4013; Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751; Case C-115/97 Brentjens 
[1999] ECR I-6025; C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6021 (these last two cases both concerned two 
funds); C-180/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451. 
44 See Mossialos and McKee, n 8 above, at 165; Hatzopoulos ‘Killing National Health Systems’ n 26 above, at 711; 
Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’ n 37 above; Jones and Sufrin, n 34 above, at 107. 
45 Mossialos and McKee, ibid, at 169; Winterstein ‘Nailing the Jellyfish: Social Security and Competition Law’ 
(1999) 6 European Competition Law Review 324. 
46 Barnard, n 41 above.  
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The variable importance of solidarity and subsidy 
 
This is often expressed in terms of solidarity, as if this is the vital concept.47 However, solidarity 
can be achieved in two ways; internal cross-subsidy between clients of the fund, and external 
subsidy from the state, or from other funds. It is the latter of these which matters, as the cases, 
and good sense indicate. There can be no principle that internal cross-subsidy renders an activity 
non-economic without excluding eat-all-you-can buffets and airlines from the internal market. 
Indeed, there are few, if any, services where the customer pays for exactly what they get. Every 
standard package for a standard price involves cross-subsidy.  
 
By contrast, external subsidy seems, prima facie, a better indicator of a non-economic character. 
Constant top-ups to prevent bankruptcy or shortfall do make a fund look less ‘economic’ and 
more ‘social’. Nevertheless, external subsidy cannot in itself render a service non-economic. 
Otherwise state aid law would be self-destructing: the fact of subsidising a company would mean 
it was no longer engaging in ‘economic’ activities and so competition law (including state aid) 
would no longer apply. 
 
Rather, external subsidy, if it becomes significant enough, may mean that the contribution of the 
service recipient – the teachers – is no longer sufficient to be characterised as payment for what 
they receive. It may have become a ‘symbolic’ contribution to a system essentially funded by the 
state.48 Perhaps this point is reached when state subsidy is a fund’s majority income.49 
 
The question then arises whether the state subsidy itself could be seen as payment for the 
services provided – after all it matters not who pays, so long as someone does. In one sense 
payment is precisely what it is. However, too broad an interpretation of payment renders the 
requirement vacuous;50 every service requires funding from somewhere. Even a priest has to eat. 
The question is whether the subsidy is in exchange for the services, in a contract-like way. In the 
cases involving non-economic social funds it clearly was not.51 That can be supported and 
understood by looking at the way subsidies and top-ups work. 
 
In commercial transactions terms are, generally, fixed in advance. There may be a fee for a 
service, or a fee for a bundle of services – you will treat all patients who arrive between now and 
March, all students who enrol this year. However, a relationship of the form ‘you will provide 
services and I will give you the money you need to stay afloat’ – is alien to commerce. The 
discrepancy between the price agreed in advance and the actual cost or value is the essence of 
deal-making.52 Hence there must be initial terms. Thus if the state were to agree to pay a certain 
amount per teacher to the fund for the next three years in return for that fund’s provision of 
services, this should perhaps be called a provision of services for payment, and the fund would 
be behaving as an undertaking. If the fund goes to the state cap in hand and receives a bale-out, 
while the income may be the same the transactional structure is different. The problem with 
                                                 
47 See discussion in Barnard, ibid.  
48 Humbel, n 31 above. 
49 Davies ‘Welfare as a Service’ n 37 above. 
50 Koutrakos, n 32 above, at 114. 
51 The point does not appear to have been argued as such. Still, this absence of remuneration is implicit in the ratio 
of the cases. 
52 See Hatzopoulos ‘Killing National Health Systems’ n 26 above, at 706. 
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characterising such relationships is that they may consist of a mix of apparent ‘contracts’ and 
bale-outs. The political reality may be that the fund cannot be allowed to fail, and has in effect an 
open-ended guarantee. The renders the ‘contracts’ somewhat artificial, and it could well be 
argued that even if considered alone they would comprise ‘payment’ that character is 
undermined by the broader financial relationship. In short, when leaky social funds are 
essentially guaranteed public support, the financial relationship between them and the state is no 
longer one of remuneration. 
 
The tendency has often been to assume that wholly state funded and provided services are non-
economic. However this cannot be a general rule. Governments can own organisations that 
compete actively on open markets, and even tender competitively for government contracts.53 
Mere ownership is not the point. Yet where a public university provided almost free education to 
students the Court did not hesitate to find it a non-economic activity, and did not even consider 
whether the state funding might be payment (admittedly it was apparently not argued).54 
 
It probably would not have been. For one thing, the university was probably under the control, 
perhaps even an element of, one or other ministry. For another, it probably had a budget 
containing large amounts for fixed salary and infrastructure costs, and no pre-determined 
performance payments; no payments per class, or per student, or per publication. That was, until 
recently, not the European way. Both factors mean that it would have been difficult to identify 
any reasonably precisely defined contract-like exchanges. Without such exchanges, flows of 
money are better called ‘funding’ or ‘subsidy’ than ‘payment’. Hence the university was non-
economic. By contrast, a public hospital which provides all the hip-replacements in a given town 
in a given year in return for a fixed sum from a public insurance fund would be providing 
economic services, notwithstanding the public character of both sides of the deal.55 The 
transaction is large, but market-ready. 
 
Changing welfare states 
 
Following the above analysis, a few decades ago it would have been unconvincing to describe 
the majority of welfare services as ‘in return for payment’. Education and health care were 
largely provided by public institutions, whose funding was not directly linked to the services 
they provided; it was not per head, or per operation. Even social insurance, while often funded 
by worker and employer contributions, tended to involve so much intra- and inter-institutional 
subsidy that the link between what an individual paid and what they received was more symbolic 
than measurable. One bought entrance to a system in which benefits were then provided on a 
basis of need more than contribution. The contribution provided by the individual and the benefit 
provided by the state were reciprocal in a moral-constitutional sense, but to describe their 
exchange as a purchase transaction would have surprised many. On the other hand, the state 
payments were ad hoc and open-ended, and so did not constitute payment either. 
 
                                                 
53 See generally on this Jones and Sufrin, n 34 above, at 110-118. 
54 Humbel, n 31 above. 
55 This form of block-contract relationship is found in the Dutch health-care system, and was considered in Geraets-
Smits, n 32 above.  
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That is significantly less true today. A number of trends in welfare make it far easier to identify 
payments for services.56 The most obvious is simply privatisation; particularly in health care 
many states make greater use of private providers within their system than was formerly the 
case.57 A second trend is to put greater emphasis on cost control.58 That is partly the result of 
economic and budgetary disciplines resulting from EU membership, and particularly the Euro,59 
and partly the result of a perception that international competition requires European states to 
reduce their tax burden, and consequently to reduce spending.60 In recent decades the fashion has 
been to think that competition and market-like behaviour within public organisations can 
contribute usefully to this process.61 Thus there is greater use of payment linked to performance, 
with institutions being reimbursed according to what they achieve – how many patients they 
treat, or students they graduate, for example. Finally, greater individual choice has become a 
motif within public sector reform, with governments placing an emphasis on allowing 
individuals to choose which doctor, school, or pension provider they deal with.62 A consequence 
of this has often been that financing systems change, so that money follows the consumer rather 
than the provider; if a patient or a child enrols, the institution treating or teaching them will be 
paid for this by the state; invisible vouchers, since the term as such is not yet widely used in 
Europe.63 
 
All of these trends create and expose payments where previously there was funding; for that 
operation the hospital received so much; for my teaching and examination the university 
received that; and so on. In health care, the Court has already indicated that it considers the entire 
sector to consist of economic activity, whether public institutions are involved or not.64 Where 
higher education is concerned, it has indicated the reverse, but in the context of a monopolistic 
                                                 
56 Davies ‘Competition, Free Movement, and Consumers of Public Services’ n 35 above; Koutrakos, n 32 above; 
Lang, n 9 above, at 46; Wyatt ‘Community Competence to Regulate Medical Services’ in Dougan and Spaventa, n 9 
above, 131 at 135. 
57 Burchhardt ‘Boundaries between Public and Private Welfare: a Typology and Map of Services’ Centre for 
Analysis of Social Exclusion Paper no. 2 (1997), available from www.sticerd.lse.ac.uk; Ascoli (ed) Dilemmas of the 
Welfare Mix: New Structures of Welfare in an Era of Privatisation (Kluwer/Springer 2002); George ‘Political 
Ideology, Globalisation and Welfare Futures in Europe’ (1998) 27 Journal of Social Policy 17; Wyatt, ibid. C.f. 
Kautto, n 4 above. 
58 Abel-Smith and Mossialos ‘Cost-containment and health care reform: a study of the European Union’ (1994) 28 
Health Policy 89; Ham and Brommels ‘Health care reforms in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Sweden’ 
(1994) Health Affairs 106. 
59 Panic ‘The Euro and the Welfare State’ in Dougan and Spaventa, n 9 above, 25. 
60 There are varying views on the accuracy of this perception. See Avi-Yorah Globalization, ‘Tax Competition and 
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review; Pieters (ed) European Social Security and 
Global Politics (Kluwer Law International, 2003); Rhodes Globalisation, European Economic Integration, and 
Social Protection (European University Institute, 2002). 
61 See e.g. Weiler ‘States, Markets and University Funding: New Paradigms for Higher Education in Europe’ (2000) 
30 Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education, 333; Neave ‘On the cultivation of quality, efficiency and 
enterprise: an overview of recent trends in higher education in Western Europe, 1986-1988’ (1988) 23 European 
Journal of Education 7; Ascoli, n 57 above; Abel-Smith and Mossialos, n 58 above. See Marmor, Fads and 
Fashions, n 1above, for a skeptical stance concerning markets and efficiency where healthcare is concerned. 
62 See Burchardt, n 57 above; Saltman and Figueras ‘Analyzing the evidence on European health care reforms’ 
(1998) Health Affairs 85; See more broadly Rosenthal The Era of Choice. The Ability to Choose and the 
Transformation of Contemporary Life (CUP, 2000) 
63 See Davies ‘Competition, Free Movement and Consumers of Public Services’, n 35 above. 
64 Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509. 
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Belgian state system with purely nominal fees.65 Today, the contribution of fees to funding is 
much more important, and the behaviour of universities much more competitive and market-like. 
Many degrees in the UK, and some post-graduate degrees in other Member States, are now 
provided in a way that could clearly be said to be for remuneration.66 So may much school 
education be; lacking the research function commonly attributed to universities school education 
finance is more transparent. The correlation between the educational service provided and the 
funding from the state is far more direct and persuasive than in the context of higher education, 
where cross-subsidy between faculties and between the different functions and sources of funds 
within a faculty may mean that identifying payment for education may be a great deal harder.67 
In fact in many states there is already significant competition between schools for pupils and a 
large part of school education is provided by non-state institutions who are remunerated by the 
state and/or parents.68 There is a competitive market inhabited by undertakings.  
 
Finally, within the social insurance world, the desire to control and contain budgets has led to 
pressure on collective funds to be self-sustaining and to adjust payouts according to income, 
rather than seeking tax-funded subsidy.69 This is true within non-governmental institutions such 
as pension funds, which increase or adjust premiums or payments according to their fortunes, but 
also at the public level, where governments increasingly attempt to ring-fence particular funds, 
and to balance contributions and payments, rather than treating it as part of the greater tax 
revenue pot.70 This makes it possible to identify given groups of payments as very much ‘for’ 
given insurance policies.  
 
There have often been attempts to exclude economic law by arguing that services have a 
‘special’ social importance.71 Welfare services, however organised, have an inherently social, 
and non-economic, character, goes the argument. The Court rejects this unequivocally, holding 
that the special nature of services does not remove them from the scope of free movement.72 The 
Treaty makes the same point concerning competition.73 This is understandable. The line between 
socially important services and others is an impossible one. Who would want to live without 
food processing, news reporting, or transport? Indeed, if socially vital services were not within 
the Treaty it would seem equally arguable that socially vital transactions in goods should also be 
excluded; the structure of free movement law and competition is not different for goods and for 
services. So would the sale of food, medicines, vehicles and clothes be ‘non-economic’? Bearing 
in mind that the philosophy of the internal market is that its provisions can ultimately improve 
the provision of the goods and services to which it applies, albeit with the need for derogations at 
                                                 
65 Humbel, n 31 above. 
66 Davies ‘Welfare as a Service’ n 37 above. 
67 C.f. Commission decision on state aid N 37/03. 
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times, it seems a sensible choice to do the work of protecting welfare at the stage of justification, 
rather than of applicability.74 
 
Does it matter anyway? 
 
The categorisation of domestic welfare services as economic is often less important than 
governments seem to think it is. The most common situations are either that an individual wishes 
to receive services abroad and is denied reimbursement by their state, where they would receive 
it were a domestic provider used, or that a foreign service provider wishes to market its activities 
in a state and encounters regulatory or policy obstacles. In both these cases the services that are 
to be received or provided are manifestly ‘for remuneration’. It is precisely because the foreign 
hospital is demanding payment that the patient is forced to demand and sue for reimbursement. It 
is precisely the hope of being remunerated for their activities that induces foreign providers to 
enter a market; international charities apart. The domestic system, which may be operated in a 
relatively non-economic way, perhaps free at the point of delivery, is not providing the services 
that are in issue in the case. Whether its services are ‘for remuneration’ is beside the point.  
 
Rather, the role of the domestic health, education or social insurance system in such a lawsuit is 
as the obstacle; it is the offer of domestic services combined with refusal to pay for foreign ones 
which creates the disparity, the discrimination against the foreign, and the obstacle to cross-
border services. Hence attempts by the UK government to argue that it should not be obliged to 
pay for foreign medical treatment because the National Health Service provides free health care, 
and is thus outside free movement law, failed. The point was moot.75  
 
A sucking noise 
 
The law above creates a mechanism of influence between states, which in turn generates 
momentum for the process of including welfare within economic law. This influence is the 
result, paradoxically, of the autonomy of states to create their own welfare systems. That 
autonomy does not, initially, oblige any state to organise their welfare in a market-like way. 
However, it permits it.  
 
Once one, or more, Member States start to do this they create opportunities for entry to their 
system by residents of other states. Economically functioning institutions will welcome out of 
state clients as much as domestic ones – they will even seek them. This puts pressure on the 
more monolithic systems of other states to adapt to that exit, which is likely to mean creating a 
more flexible domestic welfare provision mechanism and decentralising the risks of client loss 
away from the state – liberalisation. Economically functioning institutions in one state will also 
have a natural desire to enter other markets, thus forcing less market-like states to defend their 
closed systems, which as is seen below is difficult. They can, in principle, maintain non-market 
like provision while allowing market-providers to operate alongside, but the economic fragility 
of the public institutions in such a context once again creates a pressure for liberalisation.76 
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On a more political level, the widespread provision of welfare within a market changes the 
concept of ‘normality’. It is now accepted that health care is ‘normally’ provided for 
remuneration, while education is not. Changes in a sufficient number of states change the 
perception of what is ‘normal’, and that perception will then influence the application of the law 
in others. 
 
3.2 RESTRICTIONS ON FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION 
 
Given the presence of economic activity, the next stage is to ask whether there are restrictions on 
free movement or competition. A restriction on the free movement of services is any measure 
which hinders or makes less attractive the provision or receipt of cross-border services.77 A 
restriction on competition is a convenient abbreviation for any measure which prevents, restricts, 
or distorts competition, or is liable to do so, and as such is prima facie prohibited.78 The two 
definitions apply in general to different actors – to state and private parties respectively, but are 
otherwise essentially equivalent.79 They catch measures which preserve the market structure and 
make it harder for customers to change provider or for new providers to enter the national 
market. They are as broadly applied as their wording suggests.80 
 
The welfare state abounds with such measures. They are its essence. It is defined by national 
closure and state direction. Examples will make this clear. 
 
Health care cases have led the way, with a number of law suits by patients wishing to go abroad 
for medical treatment.81 All participated in national insurance schemes which provided for health 
care within their own Member State, but refused to pay for it abroad unless a medical need could 
be shown. The Court of Justice found this to be in conflict with the Treaty. It was a violation of 
free movement and non-discrimination for an insurance policy to restrict its payments to 
providers in a particular state. Where hospital treatment was concerned, the Court found that the 
financial risks involved in allowing patients to seek treatment abroad at will might be so 
significant that a restriction of their choice might be justified.82 However, for outpatient 
treatment the national rules were set aside, and as a result individuals within the EU now have a 
right to receive such treatment in any Member State and be reimbursed as if it was at home.83 
Moreover, the justified exception for hospital treatment is likely to have a limited shelf-life; it 
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was neither an absolute nor a necessarily permanent derogation. It remains open to patients to 
make arguments based on medical or personal circumstances for treatment abroad, and Member 
States are required to provide expedited and effective legal processes for assessing these.84 The 
likelihood is that lawsuit numbers will swell, and there will be considerable pressure on 
insurance companies to amend their policies. It may well be easier to abandon the principle of 
national-only treatment, even at the risk of some loss of cost and quality control, than it is to 
maintain it against a growing tide of litigious patients backed by a purposive and unpredictable 
Court of Justice.85 At the very least we may find that policies increasingly offer a ‘treatment 
anywhere’ option, even if this is more expensive. 
 
Health care providers are likely to be ultimately a greater source of national restructuring than 
litigious patients. Medical institutions based in countries that allow profit-making or non-public 
hospitals are increasingly looking to expand abroad. Here they typically come across a number 
of obstacles. Some Member States do not allow medical institutions to be profit-making. 86 Most 
limit the numbers of hospitals in a given area, and may be hostile to a foreign company wishing 
to start a new one. Many will regulate the costs that may be charged for treatments,87 and the 
kinds of treatments permitted; accepted medical treatment in one state may not be permitted in 
another, or may fall outside standard insurance policies, whose definition of what is ‘medically 
necessary’ is often largely based on national practices.88 All of these rules may be quite 
understandable, but they will tend to make it more difficult for a foreign provider to enter the 
local market and constitute obstacles to movement.  
 
In education there have been fewer and less dramatic cases, but this is because the process is at 
an earlier stage more than because of any fundamental conceptual difference. Analogous forms 
of arguments can be made. The parent wishing to send their child to a foreign school or college 
may find that their home state refuses to pay for this, or refuses to allow export of financial 
support, clearly creating an obstacle to movement.89 At the moment it is sometimes the case that 
the cost of educating non-nationally resident schoolchildren is borne by their host government, a 
strange and illogical situation which can only survive while the number of migrants is small. The 
state with the obligation is that where the parents are members of society, and that obligation to 
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pay for education on a non-discriminatory basis – i.e abroad if the parents so wish - is not yet 
fully realised.90  
 
There may also be quotas for certain courses of study, and states facing large numbers of 
incoming students may be tempted to give priority to locals.91 The university wishing to open a 
branch in another Member State and offer degrees there may discover a multitude of local laws 
which impede it. Most notoriously, foreign universities attempting to operate in Greece have 
found themselves on the wrong side of the national constitution, which makes higher education a 
state monopoly.92 This is in irreconcilable conflict with the Treaty, and while Greek courts have 
been reluctant to accept this,93 unless they are prepared to reject the supremacy of EU law, an act 
of defiance which would be close to judicial rejection of Membership of the EU, the days of the 
national monopoly are numbered.  
 
At the more mundane level, even national syllabi, rules on teaching, or ownership and operation 
of schools and institutions may be restrictions, if they make it harder for foreign institutions to 
enter the state – as they will do. A major restriction is likely to be states that refuse to pay, or to 
pay equally, towards the cost of non-state schools. At the moment educational freedom is the 
norm in Europe, in that parents may choose to send their children to privately run schools. In 
some states these provide most education, in others just a small percentage. They very often 
receive a contribution to their costs from the state, with parents making up the rest. However, if 
such schools are foreign-owned, wishing to provide educational services, then a choice by the 
state to only partially pay for education there, while they would fully pay for it at a state school, 
is clearly a restriction on establishment – it will tend to hinder the establishment of foreign 
schools.94 The situation is precisely analogous to that which has arisen in the context of medical 
care.95  
 
Many will see this as surprising. Surely a state should be allowed to run its own schools? Why is 
it obliged to pay non-system schools as well? Is this not an obligation to privatise, contrary to the 
official position that the EU is neutral on questions of ownership?96 Yet the fact is that provision 
of free education at nationally owned schools and a refusal to pay the equivalent costs to foreign 
owned ones quite clearly steers local pupils to the national schools, which is prima facie 
discriminatory, as well as a deterrent to any foreign schools wishing to enter the market. That is 
not at all to say that such a position could not be justified by other factors, but that the 
substantive discussion of whether EU law allows such a national preference is to be done within 
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the context of justification rather than within the context of applicability. Some of the policy 
reasons for this are discussed below.97 
 
The oddity of the situation is this: insofar as the state prefers state run schools over domestically-
owned private schools providing education within the borders, the situation is wholly internal. 
There is no cross-border element, and so EU law does not become involved. It requires foreign 
schools to want to enter the market (or parents to send their children abroad – the argument is 
similar) to engage that law. At the moment educational chains and multi-school groups exist only 
to a limited extent, and within particular nations. Hence the legal issue is still moot. However, as 
they become aware of their right to participate in foreign markets, and as Europeans become 
more aware of each other, we may expect growth. In particular, it seems likely that school 
organisations based in countries with good educational reputations may well be able to market 
affiliates in countries where educational discontent is higher. In the future it may not be odd that, 
say, a well-known university from one country will also operate a trans-European chain of 
schools, exploiting its reputation, and receiving payment from the states in which it operates 
according to the rates that each state’s educational budget provides for – and perhaps also asking 
for top-ups from parents. 
 
Social insurance offers some of the most interesting possibilities for diversification. In principle, 
an EU citizen may ask him or her-self why he or she is obliged to buy their unemployment or 
incapacity insurance from the state, via a compulsory deduction from the pay packet, when 
perhaps they could get a better deal from some other institution. The short answer lies in the need 
for risk-pooling in order to achieve solidarity; compulsory membership of the scheme means that 
the good risks can subsidise the bad, rendering universal coverage possible. Without this the 
European goal of a comprehensive welfare system is lost. Yet it is possible to reconcile the two; 
the premium paid by a good risk can be broken down into an element that is payment for that 
individual’s own insurance, and an element that is contribution to the scheme as a whole. 
Solidarity justifies compulsion for the latter payment, but it is arguable that there is no reason 
why the individual should not be free to spend the personal element of their premium with the 
provider of their choice. In fact this is a simplification. There are numerous mechanisms for 
pooling of risk within a competitive market, involving inter-institutional or state-institution and 
institution-state transfers.98 While these each raise their own legal issues,99 they do indicate that 
national or sectoral monopolies are not necessary to achieve either solidarity or universal cover. 
Such allocation of the market is a significant restriction on provision and competition which may 
be difficult to justify. 
 
Finally, one should also consider the minor parts of the welfare state, the many small services 
and institutions which link and integrate the larger more obvious ones, fill the gaps they leave, 
and create a true system. Crèches, job-centres, housing for the disabled (public housing generally 
is a subject in itself), specialised training and reintegration into the workforce, free transport for 
certain groups of people, ambulance services…many of these will be provided by autonomous 
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institutions, and remuneration for their services will be identifiable.100 At the same time, there 
may be little meaningful choice for the customer or openness to new providers. Such interstitial 
services may provide some of the most accessible contexts for free movement arguments. 
 
What is evident is that where free movement principles have their way, they will dismantle state 
structure, and indeed any structures of uniformity and compulsion. The corollary of freedom is 
diversity, at least in the short term,101 and the potential for anyone to offer their services. For 
individuals this will tend to mean a right to exit, and to exportability of benefits, while for 
institutions it will mean a right of entry to national systems of provision, to share in the potential 
profits.102  
 
Competition law works similarly. It addresses the situation where limited welfare markets 
already exist, and the state grants the players a role in determining how that market operates. 
They may be authorised to agree price ranges, share markets, limit forms of competition, and 
even determine whether the market can sustain new entrants.  A particularly important example 
is where social insurance funds are given authority to require compulsory affiliation for persons 
falling within their sphere of activity, i.e. those within an industry sector or profession.103 Such 
rules are also likely to be restrictions on free movement, and in the cases the arguments of both 
types blur into each other. If the activity is found to be economic then there will be a prima facie 
double offence, but in both cases the final result will turn on whether there is adequate 
justification.  
 
3.3 DO NATIONAL SYSTEMS COUNT FOR NOTHING? THE ROLE OF JUSTIFICATION 
 
The extent to which restrictive national structures survive the law depends upon the degree to 
which they can be justified.104 For free movement it is merely necessary to show that national 
measures fulfil some pressing social or other need, and go no further than necessary.105 This 
open approach to justification corresponds to the extremely low threshold for finding the 
existence of a restriction.106 This is where the policy defence of national welfare systems at last 
finds its place. The state may argue that although its complicated and restrictive systems of 
domestic provision do indeed discourage individuals from going abroad for services, and do 
indeed make it hard for foreign providers to operate in their state, they are nevertheless so 
important and vital to society that they should take precedence over free movement.  
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Sometimes the state wins, but there are a number of reasons why it is more difficult to make a 
successful case than first appearances would suggest. Many of the justifications that spring to 
mind for restrictions on movement conflict with EU policy, and are effectively pre-empted. For 
example, in early cases it was common for states to plead the need to protect the consumer; how 
can we pay for medical treatment in institutions which we cannot supervise, and whose quality 
we cannot guarantee?107 Therefore medical treatment will only be paid for within the 
jurisdiction. However, mutual recognition renders this case inadmissible without good concrete 
evidence for quality problems. The presumption must be that services abroad are of sufficient 
quality to meet national standards, and it is for the restrictive state to prove the contrary;108 
difficult since part of their case is that they cannot adequately know what is going on abroad! 
Moreover, merely pointing to differences in regulation – their law does not guarantee this – is 
inadequate. The principle behind mutual recognition is that different systems achieve more or 
less the same ends, are functionally equivalent.109 Their differences are not as such reasons for 
rejection. 
 
Functional and Economic Reasons 
 
Another reason for restricting welfare freedom is often referred to as the ‘cohesion’ or 
‘coherence’ of the national system.110 In a well functioning welfare state institutions are often 
integrated with each other, as is their funding. Opting out of a single service can undermine the 
mechanics of the wider machine. For example standard presentation of information – job 
histories, income, medical treatment, education – shared between institutions means that 
qualification for benefits is easily established and cheating avoided. Out-of-system provision 
which does not result in such information being fed in to the national databanks undermines this. 
Individual power to opt-out ad-hoc also makes planning harder, with not only economic 
consequences but functional ones, as highly variable demand creates intermittent waiting lists or 
overloads.111 
 
These are legitimate arguments, and will sometimes succeed, but are often reflexively 
conservative. On the evidence of the case law, states tend to defend their systems as they are 
without seriously considering if they could be flexible. Yet despite lip service paid to national 
autonomy to design welfare systems, it is quite clear that this must be done in a way respecting 
Community law.112 That means that respect for free movement must as far as possible be built 
into the system.113 Therefore it is not adequate for a state to plead functional problems alone. It 
must also show that it is not reasonably practical for it to adjust its system to allow the 
movement. Its restrictions must be genuinely necessary. This leads to hypothetical and 
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speculative debates whose difficulties are discussed below. Moreover, even if the problems are 
genuine, proportionality requires that they be balanced against the interests of the free mover. 
Institutional and collective interests do not always take precedence.114 The making of this 
balance is invariably difficult, and the Court may be inclined towards an integrationist 
approach.115 Moreover, the state desire for certainty may encourage them to adjust systems that 
might in fact be defensible rather than risk a negative law suit – gold plating as it is sometimes 
called, going beyond what the law clearly requires in order to avoid any risk of violation.116 This 
is particularly the case since the Court has insisted that there must be accessible legal processes 
for individuals to vindicate their welfare rights.117 Suing the state is not something that most 
citizens do lightly, but the Court is making it as realistic an option as it can. The sheer number of 
potential lawsuits may force states into retreat, especially given that where medical services are 
concerned individuals may be desperate – beyond being deterred by legal arguments, and 
motivated by a sense of moral right – and may, in generous European states, be supported by 
public assistance with legal costs.118 
 
Finally, although it may be difficult to establish the force of this, the context of the balance is 
unsympathetic for states. Taking place as it does within an individual law suit there is invariably 
an individual with a sob-story, a need or desire for treatment or education abroad, and the state 
pitting apparently bureaucratic arguments against them.119 Most readers reading the documents 
of a case, and so perhaps also most judges, will find themselves rooting for the individual. The 
Court reinforces this by requiring examination of all the particular circumstances of the 
individual; even a rule that in general is justified does not serve to automatically rebut an 
individual claim.120 There must always be room for flexibility. This is an unusual and demanding 
approach to regulation.121 
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However, the greatest difficulties for states arise from the Court’s presentation of free movement 
as more than an economic policy, but as a ‘fundamental freedom’, language clearly chosen to 
remind the reader of ‘fundamental rights’.122 Indeed, in recent cases it has explicitly indicated 
that free movement, even where businesses rather than individuals are involved, is something 
that has a moral force entitling it to be placed in a balance against more traditional rights and 
freedoms.123 As a consequence of this approach, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court has 
consistently found that ‘purely economic’ reasons can never justify a restriction of free 
movement.124 The state may restrict movement to protect consumers, the environment, public 
health and safety, but never simply to save money. Freedoms are, implicitly, beyond price. 
 
This decision is devastating for welfare structures. While there are some non-economic 
arguments for restricting welfare exit and entry, states’ major concern about liberalising welfare 
provision is that it will lead to escalating costs. The form of the argument is usually that since the 
state is required to maintain an educational and health infrastructure for broad strategic reasons – 
this is what states do, it is unacceptable that the state might not be able to care for its own 
population – it must be able to guarantee a cost-effective level of usage of this. If individuals are 
permitted to exit the structure, or foreign entities to compete with it and undermine it, then it will 
become prohibitively expensive. Therefore even if the bill for medical or educational services 
abroad is lower than it would be at home, reimbursement may be a drain on national resources. 
The domestic bill includes a large element for fixed infrastructural costs which one way or 
another must be paid anyway. The state will effectively be paying twice.125 
 
This is not a bad argument, but the Court has excluded it. It will only consider such a case where 
the financial impact of the foreign provision is such that the stability of the entire domestic 
system is threatened, so that the financial argument can be recast as one about health or 
education.126 Hospital treatment, because of its huge infrastructural costs, was such a case.127 The 
argument is far less convincing in the context of educational or social insurance establishments, 
which are far more easily adaptable to changing numbers – and where domestic demographic 
and social factors may dwarf the effects of cross-border exit in any case. Entry of foreign 
institutions is likely to ultimately have the greater effect, but in this case the national 
infrastructure is being maintained, so an argument from welfare is again not convincing. The 
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objection to entry must be based on the threat to the public character of the system – an argument 
of another type, discussed below. 
 
The Court’s approach has two fundamental weaknesses. One is that it is facile to oppose the 
economic to the moral as it implicitly does. States provide services paid for with money, and less 
money means fewer services to people who need or at least appreciate them. When made by a 
state there is no fundamental difference between a welfare and an economic argument. The other 
problem is that it remains ambiguous how any threat to system stability is to be judged. 
Manifestly, the costs in an individual case are never sufficient to panic the treasury. The Court is 
rather focussing on the costs of changing or abolishing a restrictive rule – how many more 




Not only is this fantastically speculative, and estimates from well-informed experts differ wildly, 
but it is an ill-defined question if considered without a time frame. How many would go for 
treatment abroad next year, or how many would study abroad over the next ten years, or how 
many would buy their unemployment insurance from a foreign provider, ultimately, one day, 
next month?  
 
This ambiguity works against the Member States. Because of the structure of the legal context, it 
is they who are on the defensive, and required to justify their restrictions. Therefore they must 
produce evidence indicating a threat.129 How? Of course an American lawyer, or even some 
national European lawyers, might not be worried by this situation; they would commission 
experts, prepare reports, and proffer their own interpretation of how the question should be 
answered, and be prepared to fight that out in court. Unfortunately for this approach there is no 
tradition of meaningful empirical or quantitative analysis in free movement cases.130 While many 
of the questions involved in free movement law are in essence empirical – would a given label 
confuse the consumer?131 Is the environmental impact of a given product sufficient to justify its 
prohibition?132 Are the health risks of internet pharmacies sufficient to justify their restriction?133 
– the Court’s consistent tendency is to treat them as amenable to irreducible judicial wisdom.134 
The quantitative is reduced to the qualitative, so that the law abounds with unsupported judicial 
assertions as to the effects of a particular measure on a given market, or on producers, or on 
cross-border movement.135  
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Thus a state wishing to show that its restrictions are necessary must produce a non-quantitative 
argument. In practice this means one which indicates inevitability. It must be inherently, almost 
necessarily, the case that freedom would lead to mass-exodus. Such an argument does not exist; 
nobody knows what would happen if restrictions to welfare exit were removed.  
 
To some extent the evidential position is exaggerated here. Free movement cases concerning 
private litigants begin in national courtrooms, and are, not always, referred to the Court of 
Justice. In principle how questions of effect are treated is for the national judge, who may accept 
an empirical approach notwithstanding the Court of Justice’s more analytic one.136 It may be, and 
it may be permissible, that national judges will in fact choose to engage with the details of 
sociological prediction and welfare-budgeting to decide whether the state has proved its need.137 
However it seems likely that judges will overwhelmingly take their methodological cues from 
what is the supreme court in this area. This is particularly so given that if they do not it is open to 
a litigant to force a reference, whereupon the case will essentially be relitigated under the 
European non-empirical methodology.138 Admittedly, the Court of Justice may well be 
influenced by lower court evidential findings, but there is little evidence in the case law to 
suggest that it would be overly constrained by them. There is always a way to finesse fact 
through a new analytic gloss; when German courts appeared to be taking the view that 
consumers would in fact be confused by certain products and marketing practices, the Court 
indicated that it was the hypothetical well-informed and careful consumer that was at stake, not 
the average one, and so steered them to the result it wished.139 
 
In any case, evidence would only progress the state so far. Assuming – although such mundane 
matters are never discussed before the Court of Justice140 – that the appropriate burden of proof 
would be at least as strict as the Anglo-Saxon civil law ‘balance of probabilities’, it might well 
be difficult, in such a speculative context, for the state to make a case, even with all the experts 
in the world. It is very difficult to be convincing on the subject of what individuals will do in a 
context that does not yet exist – since exit options cannot be seen as fixed and static. Rather, as 
exit becomes possible providers will react to this to stimulate it and develop the market they wish 
to occupy, and the domestic system will presumably also adapt, within its capabilities, in order to 
retain its clients or mitigate the effects of their disappearance. It is rather like predicting how 
many people would abandon Barnes and Noble to shop at a different bookstore were that to open 
on Union Square, without being able to define precisely what the bookstore would be like or how 
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Barnes and Noble would react. This predictive problem is exacerbated in the welfare context as 
some of the primary motivations to exit are the result of overcrowding, in education or health. 
These are mitigated by that exit, so that the more services are provided by out-of-system 
providers, the less motivation there is for others to leave.  
 
A rational approach might be to wait and see. Allow freedom, since it is a premise that this is a 
good thing, and see how it goes. If it does seem to be developing to the point where domestic 
systems are undermined, then impose the restrictions necessary to deal with this. If that threat 
never arises, then there is no issue to deal with. Thus the frantic resistance of Member States to 
these very first free movement and welfare cases is at first glance odd. Nothing would make their 
case more convincing than being able to show that system exit is indeed spiralling as they had 
feared. The case for restrictions will be much more persuasive if made later in the liberalisation 
process than at the beginning, and a glimpse into the abyss might persuade the Court to close off 
welfare to free movement much more conclusively than Cassandra-like prophesies made at a 
time when the number of actual welfare migrants is tiny. A drop may become a flood, but that 
claim will be more plausible if made five minutes later when it has become a stream. 
 
Unfortunately this ignores both political and legal reality. Firstly, taking rights away from the 
public is harder than not giving them in the first place. Secondly, EU law is pervaded by a 
philosophy of unidirectionality.141 Integration proceeds, perhaps slowly, but it does not regress. 
There are exceptions, but they stand out as such,142 and the general practice conforms to the 
general rhetoric of ever-deeper and ever-more. Given this it would be a brave state that would 
gamble on re-introducing restrictions once abolished. Fact may look law in the face, but it is 




Many of the difficulties with the justifications above can be seen in terms of proportionality. The 
concerns raised are generally legitimate ones, but state control or monopoly, or discrimination 
against foreign providers, are relatively extreme measures in the lexicon of free movement, and 
go further than the concerns raised strictly require. The existence of private provision of welfare 
services in many Member States demonstrates that it is technically possible to achieve a high 
quality universalist welfare state by regulation.143 To restrict openness more than such a system 
entails is therefore not justified by the pursuit of this goal. Public and monopoly provision may 
have been necessary to bring welfare states into being, but it does not appear necessary to 
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The unspeakable case 
 
The final problem facing states defending the status quo is that their core non-economic 
arguments have an amorphous and ideologically complex, not to say dubious, quality. They are 
difficult to express and difficult to make respectable. At the moment it is likely that in the 
collective consciousness of national policymakers they are not even fully formulated. They are 
arguments that sit in the gut, and rise to the head only when the gut is squeezed. 
 
These are the ones about identity and national cohesion. As will be suggested below, much of the 
importance of national welfare systems is in how they create a sense of belonging and national 
togetherness. A part of this must be a legitimate reason to defend them. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with being part of a community – it is probably a basic human need - and the 
nation is one of the communities to which most people belong, however complex and incomplete 
that belonging may be. Taking apart the structures of a community is something that deserves a 
little thought and reticence. 
 
Another perspective on this argument makes it look less savoury. Welfare is the last bastion of 
respectable nationalism, and as the surgeon occasionally has to cut into healthy flesh to be sure 
of his cure, the EU, in part a response to nationalism, will inevitably respond sceptically to 
pleading which smacks of this philosophy. States who talk of the threat posed to unity and 
national harmony by individuals who wish to put their education or health in the hands of 
foreigners expose the patriotic jugular to liberal attack. 
 
There is something legitimate to be said on this subject. There should be a way for the law to 
consider these Janus-faced but not entirely wrongful claims. Neither litigants nor the Court have 
yet found it – or shown signs of looking for it.144 The cases are currently proceeding without full 
argumentation. The interests of the nation are not fully represented in the European legal process. 
 
There would be difficulties in changing that. For one thing it would require challenge to some of 
the basic norms of EU law. How can defence of the national boundaries to welfare be squared 
with a Treaty dedicated to the removal of national borders? Education captures this tension well. 
It may be the element of the welfare state with the greatest social cohesive effect (arguably), yet 
it is also the area where the EU chose to spearhead free movement, for closely related reasons.145 
The importance of education to the formation of a world view was behind the hugely successful 
student exchange programmes which the EU has always supported. Yet the creation of a 
generation of Europeans is just a positive gloss on the reduction of a sense of national belonging. 
Loyalty is a zero-sum game. To simultaneously attack and retreat on the educational front, to 
push for integration and allow states to resist it, might bring the law to a state of confusion. 
 
More realistically, it can all be seen as a question of degree, rather than of opposition. Not 
whether, but how far, the removal of educational borders should go. Yet such broad-ranging 
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policy judgments are hardly ideal for a court.146 As well as being impossible to fit within an 
‘objective’ judgment framework they are also empirical. In the absence of legislation one can 
imagine the natural reaction of judges would be to retreat from drawing such a line. But what 
would be a retreat? Both exempting education from free movement and including it involve 
making the policy judgment. Thus perhaps the most predictable approach would be to rely on the 
integrative mission entrusted to the Court and look at the cases through that lens. This would 




Member States are still free to define the scope of their welfare protection. What is covered by 
insurance and the extent of cover is, provided the terms are not constructed to be discriminatory 
or unreasonable, at national discretion.147 Thus a refusal to pay for foreign services on the 
grounds that they fall outside national coverage is generally legitimate, and a refusal to pay 
foreign rates which may exceed national ones is legitimate too. These are a significant protection 
of national autonomy and budgets, and an important limitation on the freedom of individuals to 
travel the continent in search of the best service. They are also a significant limitation on the 
capacity of foreign providers to enter national markets, since their particular strength and 
experience may be in a service that does not fit national coverage. If the state pays for three year 
degrees, an institution offering superb four or five year ones may get few national clients. In the 
language of the law, the fact that the non-discriminatory terms of national coverage do not 
include a particular service is a legitimate justification for action – such as refusal to pay - that 
would otherwise be a prohibited restriction on free movement. 
 
However much relief this finding of the Court may have brought to national ministries, it cuts 
both ways. As well as protecting treasuries, it also undercuts some of the arguments against free 
movement – that costs will spiral, or that it is unfair to allow treatments abroad that those at 
home do not receive. By conceding that Member States are entitled to define the ‘what’ of 
welfare the Court makes it harder for them to justify controlling the ‘who’. This concession to 
national policy autonomy actually helps speed up the removal of borders and the institutional 
fragmentation of welfare provision. 
 
Universality is another good, but limited argument. There is no doubt that the desire of the state 
to ensure universal welfare services of a high standard for its population is legitimate, and would 
be accepted as such by the Court.148 Indeed, it is the official philosophy of the EU.149 Since the 
basis of universality is cross-subsidy between citizens, it is often used as an argument for state 
monopolies; everyone must participate to ensure that everyone can be protected. If the good risks 
or the strong exit, the weak are left unprotected. However, provided the state has the capacity to 
tax and to regulate, cross-subsidy can also be achieved in a fragmented market. It requires 
mechanisms for redistribution of funds between different market players, and/or between 
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providers and the state, but such systems are certainly possible. Hence while universality is a 
good goal, it does not take states where they want to go; it will tend to be disproportionate to use 
it to justify excluding foreign or non-state providers from the field. It can be arrived at in a less 
exclusionary way. 
 
Another argument sometime made is that states have the right to have the system of their choice. 
Since welfare provision falls primarily within their competence, it is for them to choose their 
system. Thus EU law should not impose obligations whose effects are such that the essential 
character or nature of the system changes. 
 
At a formal, or narrowly legal, level, this argument has not succeeded so far, and does not look 
convincing. While Member States do indeed have free choice in how to organise welfare, this is 
subject, as are all their actions, to their Treaty obligations to free movement and non-
discrimination.150 There is no principle that EU law should only have limited effects. If a system 
is so little compatible with EU law that bringing it into line entails fundamental changes, so be it. 
A Treaty obligation is a Treaty obligation.  
 
However, at a political level it is more persuasive. It can be presented in terms of the democratic 
desire of the population to organise in a certain way.151 While that democratic desire can perhaps 
not extend so far as discrimination, if that population wishes to be in the EU, as a factor in 
weighing up less objectionable or extreme restrictions on movement it could be seen as 
legitimate. 
 
Moreover, it can be put in a constitutional way, which may have the effect of engaging new legal 
issues and raising the stakes of the game. If state provision of a particular aspect of welfare – 
most likely education – could be seen as a part of the essential structure of the state or nation, 
then it might be that national supreme courts would be reluctant to apply EU law to override this. 
Although the Court of Justice takes the view that national constitutions cannot derogate from 
Treaty obligations, not all supreme courts have accepted this absolute view of supremacy. In 
several states a ‘solange’ position is taken, that if the EU were ever to infringe on key 
constitutional requirements or protections, the supreme court would at that point intervene. 
 
In the event that welfare reorganisation were interpreted by supreme courts in such a way, this 
might provoke the Court of Justice to reconsider. As with human rights, where it formally 
rejected the relevance of national constitutions while in practice adapting its doctrine to 
accommodate them, the desire to avoid a showdown might lead to a softening of views on 
welfare and free movement. The key question here is the extent to which welfare opening would 
be seen by national courts as such a constitutional crisis, a matter beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, judgments from a number of states indicate that something like this cannot be 
excluded.152 
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Competition law and services of general economic interest  
 
Where free movement is concerned, the rule that a restriction may be justified was invented by 
the Court, and the list of permissible justifications has been kept open, subject to the limits 
described above. The Treaty also provides reasons to permit a restriction on competition, but 
these are narrow, and for procedural reasons also difficult to use. The major source of derogation 
from competition rules in the context of welfare is likely to be Article 86 EC. 
 
This provides, in its second paragraph, that “undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest …shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct 
the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.”  
 
This is a paragraph that was created to deal with the privatization of industries such as telecoms, 
water, transport, and post.153 The desire to maintain universal coverage, often at standard rates, 
and prevent, for example, rural areas being deprived of services or charged high rates for them, 
meant that an entirely free market could not be allowed. Obligations of universal service, often 
combined with exclusive or monopoly rights, are tools used to constrain these markets to 
maintain social goals. Article 86 is what renders this legitimate. 
 
The phrase ‘services of general economic interest’ manifestly refers to services whose 
importance is economic, and general.154 It catches services that form the general infrastructure of 
the economy and without which other business activities could not function. Such services often 
also have an important social function as well, but the phrase does not refer to this. That is odd, 
perhaps, but would not have made any functional difference. It is not stated that the ‘tasks 
assigned’ to the industries – such as a universal postage service – must be exclusively economic. 
The phrase ‘general economic interest’ is simply a designator, which services to capture the 
industries which were then in the picture, even if not fully to characterize them. 
 
The problem is now that the law on services and establishment is reaching institutions and 
activities which were until recently not envisaged as part of the internal market; the welfare 
services under discussion here. Surely they deserve, demand, a protection of the form of Article 
86? Yet it is not quite natural to describe these services as of ‘general economic interest’. Of 
course in some sense they are important to the economy, but then so is policing and flood 
prevention and what is not? They do not, unlike their network cousins, contribute directly to the 
infrastructure of economic activity. Their function is primarily and most directly social.  
 
This textual problem has been overcome by an act of deliberate misinterpretation as 
linguistically grotesque as it may be justifiable in terms of policy. The Commission, and lawyers, 
now act as if the phrase ‘services of general economic interest’ meant the same as ‘economic 
services of general interest’.155 Thus Article 86 is considered to apply to services of general 
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interest – which clearly includes welfare services – that are provided in an economic way, and so 
would be subject to market law. Thus legal scholarship and official documents refer to two kinds 
of service; ‘services of general interest’, which are understood to be those of social importance, 
but provided in a non-economic way, and ‘services of general economic interest’ which are those 
of social importance, provided in an economic way. The linguistic violence involved is the same 
in other languages than English, and it is a mystery why there have not been more objections. 
However, the policy goal achieved is understandable. 
 
Thus Article 86 offers a limited exemption from Treaty law for welfare services.156 While it is 
primarily aimed at competition law, and tends to be used in that context, in principle it also 
applies to free movement. It is simply that since free movement is subject to case law based 
derogations the article is not so important in that context. However, as areas of activity move 
towards market-based provision, free movement and competition are often both relevant to a 
situation, and it does not seem unlikely that the Court will extend an already existing tendency to 
consider them globally in such contexts, bringing possible justifications within a single umbrella. 
In other words, Article 86 may come to be the primary legal framework for justifying restrictions 
on free movement and competition. In Commission documents it already is. 
 
The significance of this is that Article 86 is functionally oriented. Its wording magnifies the 
argument above about the difficulty of offering identity and cohesion as justifications.157 
Admittedly, a Community law argument based on textual analysis alone is a naïve argument, a 
fortiori where services of general economic interest are involved, but if text counts for anything 
then the inclusion of Article 86 in the Treaty, and the tendency to treat exemptions under 
competition and free movement as fundamentally alike, may make restrictions harder to 
preserve, and extend the market.  
 
The problem, once again, has its roots in the origin of the article. The network industries for 
which it was developed require massive infrastructure, and are often natural monopolies. 
Because of the costs of this infrastructure, and the realistic impossibility of multiple providers 
replicating it, a free market state will deliver neither as much competition nor as universal a 
service as governments want. The satisfactory reconciliation of competition and universality is 
perceived to require intervention in markets which would, in other contexts, be seen as restricting 
competition. The purpose of Article 86 is to authorize this. However, these arguments do not 
apply to welfare. The need for infrastructure, the structural difficulties with multiple providers, 
and the economies of scale are all far less. Merely achieving the core tasks of welfare does not 
require derogation from the Treaty. The reasons for derogation are more oriented towards the 
character of the system than its function. Article 86 does not reflect these concerns well.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, it is clear that Article 86 assumes that even services of general 
interest, of the type that are socially important and should be available to all persons, may be 
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provided by a regulated market. It is because of the transition to this form of provision that the 
article was introduced. Thus while it provides a framework for restrictions on market actors and 
structure, it also provides a rebuttal of arguments that a regulated market cannot be used to 
provide welfare. On the contrary, the assumption of the Treaty is that social and solidarity-
related concerns can be adequately addressed via regulation. This puts another difficulty in the 
way of states wishing to argue that the importance of welfare services must entail state, or 
national monopoly, provision. 
 
4. Positive Harmonisation of Welfare 
 
Positive harmonisation is the replacement of national rules by European ones. Three articles in 
the EC Treaty, 94, 95 and 308, allow harmonisation that could touch on the structures of the 
welfare state.158 They may be used to generate legislation that removes distortions of 
competition, or obstacles to movement, or is otherwise necessary for the operation of the 
common market. In principle they could arguably be used to build a European welfare state, in 
which a structured and institutionalised system similar to that found in Member States was 
reproduced on an EU scale. There are, as will be seen, certain difficulties with this, and no sign 
of it actually happening. 
 
The relationship between positive and negative harmonisation is complementary, or at least 
potentially so.159 Many obstacles to movement may be removed by judges. If they cannot be, 
because the state can produce compelling justifications for their existence, then this can be taken 
as a cue for positive lawmaking. EU legislation may then deal with the problem. Hence for 
example the cross-border sale of pharmaceuticals at retail level may perhaps be legitimately 
restricted by states – these are potentially dangerous products, and it is difficult for a national 
authority to police such sales or be sure that supply conforms to good medical practice.160 A 
judge might refuse to disapply national measures obstructing free movement but serving other 
important interests in this context. A solution might be European rules standardising the products 
that can be sold without prescription, and the form of prescriptions accepted by pharmacists, and 
creating a central register or even authority to supervise cross-border sales. 
 
The three reasons to legislate are simple and broad. A distortion of competition is said to occur 
when differences between the laws in different states create a potential competitive advantage for 
industries located in one of them.161 Differences in taxation, environmental and labour costs, and 
transport costs, are all potentially reasons to harmonise (albeit that there are restrictions on some 
of these as a result of other Treaty articles). The idea here is that only a uniform cost and 
regulatory base creates fair competition.162 Whether or not that is true, it is hypothetical; given 
different physical and demographic circumstances uniform regulation would not create uniform 
costs. Moreover, given that the regulatory costs in nations differ in a multitude of ways, it is far 
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from obvious that equalising a given regulatory cost renders the overall situation more, rather 
than less equal. It is also unlikely that the effects of regulation are the same for all industries. 
Once upon a time Greece had poor infrastructure, relatively few technologically trained workers, 
and few environmental rules. The Netherlands was the opposite. The EU has now largely 
harmonised environmental rules in the EU, partly in the name of undistorted competition. 
However, while certain industries in Greece may have been able to gain a competitive advantage 
over their Dutch peers by dumping rubbish in the Aegean, struggling Greek high tech industries 
may rather have envied the easy access to infrastructure and trained personnel that their Dutch 
competitors had, and experienced extra environmental cost burdens as increasing inequality 
rather than levelling. Of course there are other good reasons to protect the environment, but the 
generalised economic argument behind removing distortions of competition is over-simple. 
Harmonisation equalising specific regulatory costs tends to reflect successful self-interested 
lobbying by nations or industries, or a policy choice to forbid competition on certain grounds, 
whatever the consequences for equality. In any case, it has little to do with any objective 
interpretation of the overall competitive situation.163 
 
Harmonisation to remove obstacles to movement is easy to understand; differences between 
national rules, such as on product standards, regulation of professional activities, or 
qualifications, obstruct movement. Activity permitted in one state may be prevented in another 
because it, or its provider, does not conform to local regulation. The concept of an obstacle is at 
least as widely interpreted as in the context of negative harmonisation (any measure which 
hinders or renders less attractive cross-border movement).164 
 
Finally, Article 308 infamously offers a mop-up clause allowing any other harmonisation that 
might be necessary for the common market.165 This is hardly strictly necessary, since almost any 
regulation imposes costs, so the goal of removing distortions of competition could be used to 
harmonise almost all national law.166 However, both Court and Commission have historically 
been reluctant to draw this obvious conclusion from the definitions that they use, and Article 308 
has been quite widely used.167 
 
Clearly almost any regulatory or institutional aspect of the welfare state is both a distortion of 
competition and an obstacle to movement. It is hard to think of any element of education, health 
or social insurance where one could say that national systems make it just as easy to go abroad or 
to compete abroad as to stay at home. There is, at first glance, legislative competence to create a 
European welfare system.168 
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The limitations on this are subsidiarity and proportionality, both general principles of EU law, 
and the Court’s finding that any harmonisation within the internal market must address 
‘appreciable’ distortions (this de minimis, or something similar, probably applies to obstacles to 
movement too, although the point has never been addressed).169  
 
Appreciability simply serves to filter out the marginal, but this is hardly relevant to welfare. 
Cross-border welfare provision is not met by trivial discouragements, but by serious structural 
obstacles. Thus the last legal lines of defence against European welfare are subsidiarity and 
proportionality. The importance of these remains to be seen, and there are reasons to doubt 
whether they will be powerful constraints on competence.170  
 
It may not matter. The most effective limitation on Community action is currently not legal but 
political; the absence of any legislative will. No Member State has expressed any desire to begin 
creating a European welfare system. Moreover, such a proposition would probably be domestic 
political suicide in most Member States. One may note the fierce resistance to including health 
care, already subject to market law, in the proposed services directive.171 Countries and their 
populations appear quite clear in their current will to maintain control of their welfare systems 
and provide them with as much immunity as possible from EU law. Harmonisation of 
substantive aspects of welfare is not on the agenda.172  
 
That absence of will is not surprising. The welfare state is one of the few areas of policy where 
almost every citizen has a direct and significant interest in policy decisions, and the reaction of 
the mass to such situations is usually, and understandably, to resist radical change except in the 
face of crisis. If your health, education and security depend on an institution, and it still seems to 
serve you well, you are likely to err on the side of caution when change is proposed. The 
attempts at reform of welfare in several European states in recent decades indicate how great the 
political inertia is. 
 
From the point of view of national ministers in the Council, the primary legislators in any 
harmonisation process, they have little to gain through European measures. They are likely to be 
received with hostility at home – who wants to see control of such matters move further away 
from the citizen? – and they would also amount to a significant loss of political power for 
national politicians, including those ministers. Who gives away their own job? All this aside 
from the radical differences between European systems, which would make agreement 
impossible on what the European norm should be.173 Finally, there are economic questions. 
Different states can afford different forms and levels of protection. To harmonise levels of 
welfare without subsidy between states would be intolerable, yet to speak of sharing the burden 
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of welfare (the lion’s share of national budgets) would be to speak of a step forward in 
integration far greater than anything yet experienced, at least since the inception of free 
movement. 
 
Welfare harmonisation is not an all-or-nothing decision. It is discussed here globally for 
convenience, but one may imagine sector-specific, framework, minimal harmonisation to which 
some of the criticisms above would not apply. Still, even a marginal measure is likely to attract 
fierce resistance, not least because of the fear of a slippery slope. Currently many will take the 
view that the structure of welfare provision is outside the legislative competence of the EU. 
However legally unsupported that may be it creates a taboo in practice. This prevents even minor 
and helpful legislative measures.174  
 
5. Rolling back the Law: Prospects for a Legal Retreat from Welfare. 
 
The picture which emerges is of far-reaching negative harmonisation rules which continue to be 
applied, and are pushing a transition from public provision to provision in a European welfare 
market, combined with an apparent inability to take positive measures to balance this. However, 
pictures can change, and the inevitable response to the above is to wonder whether the Court will 
change its mind as public, political, or national judicial resistance grows, or whether the Member 
States will step in to amend the Treaty, or take other legislative action restricting the impact of 
the EU on welfare. 
 
Some of the factors relevant to this have been discussed in the previous sections – the Court’s 
consistent integrationist interpretation of the law, the logic of the Treaty text, and the political 
difficulties with legislation. However there are also deeper, less practical considerations, relevant 
to both the behaviour of Court and EU legislators, which make the opening of welfare more 
inevitable, less radical, and harder to reverse than might at first seem the case. 
 
At this point the services directive should be mentioned. At the time of writing this has been 
approved by the European Parliament, will be put before the Council in a few months, and is 
expected to become law in more or less its current form later in 2006. It is an attempt to deal 
with the wide-ranging obstacles to free movement of services and establishment, laying down 
principles and procedure to deal with national laws which may restrict these freedoms. In general 
it not only makes a large number of forms of national restriction a priori illegal, but provides 
procedures for assessing others, as well as assisting in the informational and bureaucratic aspects 
of receipt and provision of cross-border services. 
 
However, after much negotiation, the directive has been worded to exclude any application to 
welfare services. It repeatedly excludes application to healthcare services, and ‘does not affect’ 
services pursuing a social welfare goal, nor the liberalisation of services of general economic 
interest. The intention to confine the directive to traditionally commercial activities, and exclude 
social and welfare activities is very clear. Given the obvious strength of feeling in the 
Parliament, it seems unlikely that this aspect of the directive will be changed. 
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Yet this does not change very much in substance. The directive does not restrict the application 
of the Treaty freedoms to welfare services, where these are provided in an economic way, and 
nor could it do so. Secondary law cannot override primary. The case law and the principles of the 
law continue to apply. It is merely the case that cross-border educational, health and social 
insurance services will not be able to benefit from the additional clarity and procedural 
advantages that the directive offers.  
 
This creates an odd situation. When situations arise concerning economic welfare services the 
directive will be an obvious interpretative guide. Even though it formally does not apply, as a 
document interpreting the relevant Treaty article it is perfectly relevant. And yet if the Court 
allows it to be used in this way, it is partially circumventing the clear intention to exclude 
welfare from its scope. This exposes an underlying choice. Will the Court effectively extend the 
directive, by taking a consistent approach to all kinds of services, or will it use the restrictive 
philosophy expressed by the exclusion of welfare as a cue to roll back its own case law? 
Similarly, we may ask whether, if the Court does not retreat, the Member States will in due 
course amend the Treaty to make clear that free movement and competition do not apply to 
welfare services. Secondary legislation would also be possible, but more vulnerable to annulment 
– it could be interpreted as an attempt to rewrite the Treaty in the Parliament and Council. 
 
The most obvious form of retreat would be a statement – judicial or legislative – excluding 
services pursing essentially social or welfare aims from the scope of free movement or 
competition law. Many factors support such a move. It would have strong support in many states, 
and would seem to suit the current fashion for decentralisation and subsidiarity. The French 
constitutional referendum, the social charter, and the charter of fundamental rights could all 
provide a superficial basis for a more ‘welfare-friendly’ reading of the internal market.175 None 
of these reasons, it may be noted, are especially convincing upon closer examination, but at least 
at a rhetorical and political level a move away from welfare would be easy to explain. However, 
practically and philosophically it would be very problematic, in several ways.176 
 
Firstly, it may be noted that despite the economic aspect of much of free movement, it is 
fundamentally a policy of openness.177 It does not dictate national policy beyond the requirement 
that it should not create barriers to movement, that is to say that it may not effectively exclude 
the foreign from participation in national activity. The exclusion of welfare from this is therefore 
a statement that it is not considered that such important areas of life should indeed be subject to 
any principle of openness. The foreign may not be excluded from commerce, but may be 
excluded from more socially important areas. Thus, in the absence of positive harmonisation 
creating a European welfare system, any systematic exclusion of welfare effectively reduces the 
EU to a trading block with a right of personal migration between states and a then somewhat 
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anomalous emergent foreign policy. The philosophies of non-discrimination and non-nationalism 
which are at the heart of the EU are reduced to mere principles of economic efficiency, applying 
only to vulgar matters – to individuals, and to businesses - but not to the national structures that 
are the primary objects of EU law and of the EU mission. This is anathema to those who believe 
in a deeper purpose for the EU, and have a more than narrowly economic vision of its future. The 
exclusion of welfare would be the death knell of the constitution and of any constitutional EU 
ambitions.  
 
The conflict between public provision and openness 
 
The brutal fact which creates this uncomfortable position is that states don’t integrate. Large 
public providers of services will tend to dominate their own markets, either by law or in fact, 
while failing to extend their activities across the border. Public welfare institutions simply do not 
think in terms of foreign expansion. If, by contrast, they do venture into foreign fields they are 
likely to be received as unfair competitors because of their state backing.178 This will amount to 
prohibited state aid, and force them to retreat or restructure in the face of competition law. It is 
notoriously difficult for a publicly owned undertaking to be sufficiently sealed off from illegal 
assistance that it can compete freely. In any case, states do not like competing with private 
entities. If they fare badly they may be saddled either with debt or with the political costs of 
withdrawal from the market. Neither is attractive. Thus risk management will tend to drive states 
to cease provision in markets where they cannot be monopolistic or at least dominant, and retreat 
to regulation.179 It follows that if one wishes to extend the philosophy of removing borders 
beyond traditional commerce and trade, this will entail private provision. There is no obvious 
way around this.   
 
Thus there is a vision of a European welfare state, a single continent-wide bureaucracy, which 
seems distant and unpopular. Then there is a vision of national welfare states undisturbed by 
Europe, which treats the EU as a marginal economic entity. Finally there is a vision of a 
regulated market for welfare, in which each state ensures universal protection at the level of their 
choice through regulation and redistribution, but provision is without borders and hence non-
public.180 This is the only vision which is both European and realistic. Many arguments from 
democracy and economics – which tends to regard imposed solutions as inefficient - would lead 
to the exclusion of the EU.181 However, arguments from Europe will not. For some politicians 
integrationist arguments are not important. For others there is political capital invested in an idea 
that Europe should go deep. They are in a difficult position. 
 
At the moment, it is difficult to imagine such an anti-European step being initiated by the 
institutions themselves – Court or Commission. Perhaps it is significant that the Parliament, in its 
amendments to the services directive, simply chose to ensure that it did not apply to welfare. 
Positive protection of national borders was not pushed through. 
                                                 
178 Mossialos and McKee, n 8 above at 158-159. 
179 See Shaw and Aldridge ‘Consumerism, Health and Social Order’ (2003) 2 Social Policy and Society 35, at 39 
interpreting changes in the NHS as a transfer of responsibility away from the state. 
180 On this plural vision see generally Johnson, the Welfare State in Transition, n 1 above 
181 See Offe ‘The Democratic Welfare State’ (2000) IHS Political Science Paper n 68; Scharpf ‘The European Social 
Model’ , n 143 above, at 649-651. 
  45 
 
Moreover, if such a proposal was made, it would run into opposition of another kind. The 
number of individuals and institutions that are hoping to take part in cross-border welfare 
provision is increasing. For some Member States it may be a threat, but others already perceive it 
as, in the right areas, with limits, an opportunity. In the health care cases there were those who 
argued against a right to free movement, but others who intervened for the other side. There are 
states whose institutions would suffer from openness, but (some) German hospital organisations, 
British universities, and Dutch companies providing social insurance are examples of private 
bodies that already operate in a relatively commercial way, and stand to gain. These are large 
industries. Governments representing such interests will think twice before they agree to the 
principled exclusion of their companies from foreign markets. While no state welcomes EU 
interference in its own system, the political dynamic concerning a Europe-wide welfare 
exemption is much more complex and balanced. 
 
Any such exclusionary rule would create a massive potential for abuse. A definition of welfare or 
social services, or a distinction between economic and non-economic services based on goal or 
character rather than organisation would encourage states and companies to portray ever-more 
activities as ‘social’, in order to benefit from the right to protectionism. Peripheral services such 
as transport, catering and maintenance would be integrated into welfare institutions rather than 
being contracted out, in order to avoid internal market law. This would not only extend the scope 
of the exemption and narrow the scope of free movement, but create economic distortions and 
inefficiencies. It would be particularly problematic if private or profit-making welfare 
institutions were also exempted, since they would then be free of competition constraints, and 
this would be likely to have an effect on companies in other, but related areas. Since the primary 
aim of any such exemption would be to protect public welfare institutions, it would therefore 
seem more logical to exclude only these from market law. However this is not so far from the 
law now; and as discussed above it is not the application of the law to these institutions directly 
which creates the problems, but the entry or exit of providers or clients. Yet if such rights were 
denied where public institutions are present, or dominant, then an inequality issue would arise. 
German patients would have free movement rights, while British would not. A right to run 
schools in the Netherlands would exist, but perhaps not in France. Such disparities are likely to 
be intolerable to many states, and conflict with the high value placed on uniform application of 
the law by the Court. In short there are good practical reasons why the law applies to all services 
provided for remuneration, their purpose or ownership notwithstanding, and it would require 
considerable ingenuity to find a coherent and applicable way to exclude welfare as such. 
 
The easier path is to protect welfare at the stage of justification. Treaty free movement is the 
general rule, but each situation is considered to see whether other interests justify its restriction. 
This is the law as it stands, and it becomes clear why the Court developed it this way. There is 
little alternative.182 Then extending the protection of national systems is to be done via increasing 
indulgence towards state arguments for restrictions. No doubt important steps could be taken in 
this way, but the difficulties have been discussed above, and suggest that closure of the welfare 
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state will not be achieved at the justificatory stage of analysis, particularly given that it is a self-
supporting activity, in which openness supports more openness. Given that, even very small 
beginnings eventually become great changes. Leniency towards justifications is likely to slow 
more than prevent this process. 
 
6. The Social Implications of Welfare Harmonisation: Welfare Patriotism and European 
National Identities 
 
The rehabilitation of patriotism by welfare states 
 
Many Europeans have regarded patriotism as problematic since the Second World War. In the 
abstract, it has seemed an emotion rendered illegitimate by such a powerful demonstration of its 
potential consequences. More concretely, it was difficult to believe that the nations producing 
such a war were deserving of it. 
 
Still, it seems that the desire to feel good about one’s state is strong,183 for rather than abandon 
the attempt, there have been attempts to recast patriotism in a less ethnic, militaristic, and 
irrational form, most famously in terms of loyalty to a constitution containing widely accepted 
rights and principles.184 Culture and heritage also play a prominent role in official versions of 
modern national worth.185 
 
However, for many Europeans, certainly in the countries of the north-west of the continent, one 
of the greatest and most legitimate reasons for pride in their nation is its welfarist character.186 
The perception is widespread, and largely true, that nowhere else in the world has carried the 
welfare state to such heights, and nowhere else do citizens enjoy such a luxurious degree of 
protection from life’s ills, and such an all encompassing guarantee of access to care, education, 
and a civilised minimum income. 
 
There may be criticisms of the functioning of the welfare state, but the fundamental view of 
welfare services as akin to human rights, something to be available and enjoyed without regard 
to wealth or status, is ubiquitous, as is the view that it is the responsibility of the state to ensure 
that this equal and universal provision occurs.187 
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Partly this gives Europe identity.188 Its generous welfare states are distinctive, and in a time when 
the fear of homogeneity is widespread189 it enables talk of a ‘European social model’ or 
‘European values’ or a ‘European way of life’.190 Solidarity may be to Europe what freedom is to 
the United States. Instead of pursuing happiness, Europeans collectively insure against events 
detrimental to it. 
 
These ideas acquire great solidity and strong roots on society through the sheer size and scope of 
the state. It is ever present in the lives of most Europeans, and they have come to expect this. The 
institutions of welfare are shared by all and provide almost a language of public life.191 Health, 
education and social security are discussed not only, not even greatly, in terms of the needs of 
human beings, but in terms of the maintenance of the system. A European politician is less likely 
to say that the state must provide good education to all, than that it must defend and build its 
educational system – and if challenged may retort that the two are equivalent. Citizens feel 
themselves to be, and are, inhabitants of a structure, and as such its walls and staircases become 
of great and common importance. Modern Europeans live within a state as much as they live 
within a nation, and sharing that state, and knowing that its existence depends on their collective 
participation, binds them to each other.  
 
This is a source of security, but also of self-respect. The welfare state is something that helps 
Europeans feel good about themselves, and about their country, because it is one of those happy 
institutions that apparently combines self-interest with compassion for others. Some economists 
might argue that for the wealthy or healthy this is not so, because they subsidise others. 
However, most Europeans appear willing to trade some income for security. The need to be rich 
is less pressing if the risk and consequences of poverty are diminished.  
 
There is a dark side. The risk of welfare tourism, and the view of immigrants as economically 
harmful parasites, has increased in prominence in recent years and become a new focus for 
nationalism, to some extent replacing more purely racist views, in public discourse at least.192 
The defence of the welfare state can provide on the one hand a cover for more traditional 
xenophobia, and on the other hand an ideological alternative to it, enabling a closed and 
fundamentally tribal identity to be maintained for those no longer able to accept more ethnically 
founded prejudice.193 This nationalism-lite, in which politicians proclaim a formal non-racism, 
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while simultaneously pleading for policies which in practice seal and protect the indigenous 
majority, is increasingly popular,194 and enables Europeans to pander to their desire for national 
community, while avoiding confrontation with the less savoury motivations for that desire. 
However, while xenophobia and solidarity may be subconsciously intertwined in most of us, at 
the conscious level, and in public reasoning, welfare is associated almost entirely with a kinder, 
more virtuous, and even inclusive state.195  
 
In the wider world, this gives Europeans a sense of importance and value. If not the strongest or 
richest, they are able to believe in the moral worth of their communities, perhaps that Europe is 
the most good of places, the most human and progressive. Weakness relative to the United States 
– Europe’s significant other196 – can be recast as a choice for a difference philosophy of life, 
based around compassion rather than force.197  
 
The welfare state has thus done much to rehabilitate patriotism in Europe. It offers a source of 
pride that seems to have none of the downsides of the old nation-love, no ethnic tarnish, no 
imperative to war, no justification for harsh or cruel government. On the other hand, it is more 
concrete and attractive to a non-specialist public than the constitutional abstractions offered by 
philosophers.  
 
The cohesive value of shared institutions 
 
Is this gentle new self-love threatened by a welfare market? It was taken as a premise that levels 
of provision can survive a liberalisation. A thousand competing hospitals or universities need not 
lead to exclusion or loss of quality. However, diversity and individual welfare autonomy may 
challenge some of the more subtle constituent elements of welfare patriotism, and of the nation. 
They do not dismantle welfare, but they dismantle the great monopolistic institutions that have 
traditionally provided it. These institutions may of and in themselves have a cohesive and nation-
building function which is separable from the substantive services they provide.198 A world 
where the same services are received from a multiplicity of private providers may feel 
significantly different.199 
 
The passion felt by many in France for the great republican educational institutions, and by many 
in Britain for their National Health Service, which cannot be justified on quality-of-service 
grounds, at least insofar as it exceeds the emotions felt by their neighbours for their less 
institutionalised education or health systems, supports this. Yet it would be too simple only to 
focus on actual institutions – it is the feeling of institution that counts, and this can also be 
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created by good regulation. Thus although their educational and health systems are largely 
privatised, and have been for years, the Dutch continue to feel as if there is a national system of 
which they are all a part, and multiple providers are bonded by careful regulation into what 
appears to the public as a coherent whole. Good, or tight, regulation can therefore fashion public 
institutions out of private components, and there is therefore no automatic decline in the sense of 
shared experience in a move to a regulated market. 
 
However, there are many factors which make such a decline easy to allow, and hard to avoid. 
The actors in current regulated markets found in many states are almost state agents, and their 
freedom is so limited that their capacity to distinguish themselves from competitors is limited. 
Indeed, markets are often effectively allocated, whether through catchment areas for schools or 
hospitals or through compulsory affiliation to social insurance schemes. Even where there is 
choice, the behaviour of providers is so constrained that it rarely matters what one chooses.  
 
Such tight uniformity is challenged by free movement. Foreign entrants will have different ways 
of doing things, and denying them that opportunity will be exclusionary, and require the state to 
defend itself, with all the difficulties discussed above. Moreover, there is likely to be, at least to 
some extent, a snowball effect. As markets become more diverse, the public will become aware 
that in fact there are different ways of running welfare institutions, and there are choices to be 
made. We may expect them, when offered a service that matches their personal philosophy, to 
fight for the right to receive it, and so assist in the fragmentation process. Because the attachment 
to institutions is not based on their superlative function, but their social bonding function, offers 
of new and apparently better services create a conflict of interest in the individual. As well as 
self-interest being a powerful factor there is also the game-theoretical point that citizens may not 
wish to be the fool – to remain loyal to trusted institutions if everyone else is going to abandon 
them anyway. Attachment to national bodies is consistent with an acceptance of services from 
their competitors.  
 
Therefore the current situation, where quasi-national welfare institutions appear to exist even 
when provision is fragmented, may be expected to change, and for diversity and fragmentation to 
become much more apparent. This will be the basis of social change, as it becomes clear to 
citizens that they are not linked to the same institutions as their neighbours.200 Although there 
may be minimum standards for the services that they all receive, there will inevitably be 
differences in how these standards are met, and there will also be the chance to exceed these 
standards, to buy more luxurious packages. The welfare experience will no longer be uniform, 
and much less will be shared. Throughout, the hand of the state will be less visible.  
 
The result for the individual is likely to be a diminished sense of a link with one’s neighbours, 
and ultimately with one’s government – of isolation and alienation. There will also be a 
challenge to the sense of national equality, which in itself is a powerfully uniting idea. For 
society as a whole the changed experience of individuals may translate to reduced social 
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cohesion and a lesser interest in and respect for those outside one’s immediate circle, and for 
public institutions.201 
  
Education perhaps has the greatest cohesive force.202 Consider, for example, that instead of 
offering free university education in state universities, a state offers to pay a certain amount 
towards university education, and allows individuals to choose where to spend it. One may 
expect that private and foreign institutions will soon enter the market.203 Although it is not 
obvious that the level of education must inevitably decline, the collective bonding which comes 
from shared educational experience is lost, a fortiori if such an approach is used for schools. 
Standard syllabi, standard textbooks, standard teaching methods; in some countries it is even 
possible to know at any given moment precisely what page of what book is being studied by 
children of a given age, in schools throughout the land. The effect of this, and of losing it, should 
not be underestimated.  
 
Diversity in health and social insurance reduces the awareness of a protective state. Requiring 
the individual to make personal choices which distinguish them from other welfare consumers is 
not just giving them freedom, but also moving onto their shoulders some of the responsibility for 
decision-making that the state used to bear. Initially at least, this will be experienced as 
abandonment as much as liberation.204 When the Netherlands replaced its compulsory state 
sickness insurance with a competitive private-provider based system – with a basic minimum 
packet that must be offered to all without price variation between individuals – such emotions 
were apparent. Although the terms of medical care were largely unchanged, the feeling 
expressed in numerous newspaper articles and television discussions was of moving from a 
protective public system into the jaws of the market. Details strengthened this. Previously 
reimbursement of care providers was invariably direct from the insurer. Now sometimes the 
patient may receive a bill, and even though they can usually send that to their insurer rather than 
paying it directly, there is a widespread perception that the process has become more 
commercialised, with a consequent increased suspicion of the institutions involved. If they 
compete, can they be trusted? Americans will be more familiar with the idea that private 
providers can be forced to behave responsibly by making it in their own interests to do so – the 
threat of law suits or criminal punishment or loss of income if customers defect. Europeans 
presumably accept this in, for example, the context of airlines, where one hopes that the desire 
for profit does not reduce safety. Yet in the context of welfare services it is a relatively new idea 
to the continent. The idea that a provider has a personal financial interest in each service is still 
often seen as problematic.205 
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The idea of equality is also threatened. ‘Different but equal’ is often seen as an attractive idea. 
However, equality of provision in a context of competition is somewhat disingenuous. 
Competition concedes the idea that some institutions may offer better services than others. The 
reality is that in a quantifiable context such as insurance, different is likely to mean better or 
worse. There will no longer be a uniform level of social protection. Moreover, even where terms 
are equal, the fact of provision through different institutions will mean that the complete 
experience is different. Upon unemployment or sickness one institution may be efficient and 
helpful, while another may not. Who knows which person on the street will turn out to have the 
best insurance, and the best protection? The question itself is new, as is having to compare the 
qualities of doctors, or universities. Uniformity of standard, even if not actual, has been until 
now widely perceived, and been widely comforting.  
 
Equality, largely understood in a relatively formal sense, as uniformity, is a ubiquitous and 
central value in most European states. Equality of opportunity, or more substantive concepts, are 
still relatively strange.206 It is the idea of identical treatment for each person, that the state is 
blind to who stands before it, that has a grip on public imagination. Partly this is a true equality 
ideal rendered practical – substantive equality is a notoriously difficult notion to use without 
controversy.207 However it is also a preservation of the myth that all persons are the same, of a 
sense of homogeneity. This could be traced to the republican ideal, or to lingering ethnic identity, 
but its force is powerful in politics and public discourse.208  
 
Uniformity does give the individual a sense of worth and security; they are no less than their 
neighbour. For those who cannot fit the mould, who need or want to be treated differently, it of 
course presents problems, and this is the intolerant side of Europe.209 However, for those who 
can conform uniformity represents insurance against inferiority. 
 
More attractively, great monolithic state structures, however Byzantine they may be internally, 
promote a sort of social transparency.210 It would be optimistic to say that there is always 
transparency at the level of individual transactions, which may of course be frustrating and 
difficult, but there is a sort of conceptual simplicity; one goes to the relevant authority, presents 
one’s problem, does as they say, and it will be dealt with. If it is dealt with badly, that’s life; it’s 
the same for everyone. Individuals may not know in detail how the welfare state works, but 
knowing that it is public and uniform provides a sense of place within it.  
                                                 
206 See Barrett ‘The Concept and Principle of Equality in European Community Law’ in Costello and Barry (eds) 
Equality in Diversity: The New Equality Directives (Irish Centre for European Law, 2003); Schwarze European 
Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 1992). 
207 Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market, n 80 above, chapter 4. 
208 Consider the debates over headscarves: See Beller ‘The Headscarf Affair: The 
Conseil d’Etat on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society’, Texas International Law 
Journal (2004) p. 581; Jeremy Gunn ‘Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United 
States and France’, Brigham Young University Law Review (2004) p. 419; Mahlmann ‘Religious tolerance, 
Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case’, 
4:11 German Law Journal (2003), p. 1099; Davies ‘Banning the Jilbab: Reflections on Restricting Religious 
Clothing in the Light of the Court of Appeal in SB v Denbigh High School (2005) 1:3 European Constitutional Law 
Review 511-530. 
209 Ignatieff, n 193 above. 
210 See Baldock, n 11 above, at 67, on Foucault and shared understanding of institutions. 
  52 
 
The core fear is that of being left alone. Europeans fear the isolation of individual choice. This 
has been a recurring theme in popular and newspaper discussions of welfare reform; we don’t 
want to choose, we want to be secure. To put another gloss on the emotion; what do we pay the 
state for if not to make such tedious and complex decisions for us? Is the quality of life not better 
without these dull concerns? And yet in other contexts choice is embraced and accepted. There is 
no call in Europe for fewer types of car, state-run restaurants, or uniform clothing at work and 
school (religious issues aside).  
 
The major risk is that the market makes Europeans feel abandoned and isolated and ultimately 
angry, and their desire to rediscover togetherness segues into nationalism.211 If, on the other 
hand, the continent comes to accept welfare markets, then the social changes are also significant. 
Currently, European politics is dominated by a partial acceptance (and partial rejection) of the 
idea of the market as such. As a concept it stands in opposition to benign collective organisation, 
the structured, planned and wise society, which probably has at least as much, if not more, 
attraction as an ideal for most voters. But if one can accept a market for welfare, one can accept a 
market for almost any legitimate service.212 If Europeans make the mental switch in this area, it 
indicates a sea change in the underlying political structure of the continent: the final letting go of 
Marxist economics.  
 
Internally, the relationship with the state and with fellow citizens may be redefined. A more 
individualistic and self-reliant society may emerge,213 but also one that is less trusting and less 
luxurious and where citizens must expend much more energy simply looking after themselves.214 
The focus of life moves closer to the practical. A significant risk associated with this is of loss of 
solidarity.215 Where welfare experiences are not shared – in welfarist rather than universalist 
welfare states – support for redistribution is lower.216 Do we care about what we do not share? 
The fragmentation of experience may lead Europe in this direction. Alternatively, it may be that 
the monopolisation of welfare by the state stifles other forms of solidarity, and freedom of 
provision will result in a flowering of diverse forms of community. It has been argued that social 
capital would be much greater without the monopolistic welfare state – although far from 
uncontroversially.217 In any case, the liberalisation process may lead to a fundamentally different 
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shaped society, where sub-communities such as the region and the church and the family take a 
greater role in care.218  
 
Externally, relationships with the US, and with globalisation, are all potentially redefined. The 
politics of these is also built around market emotions and around difference. Europe has a long 
history of defining itself against the United States, and postulating a polarity of 
commercialisation versus civilisation.219 The social model versus the market is a new incarnation 
of this old story. Yet if the social model is delivered via the market the difference becomes 
harder to sustain. Yes, there may be differences in the degree and scope of protection, but the 
sense of fundamentally different systems of government, and of values, must be reduced. This 
may ease hostility to the US. It may also be disturbing for Europe. There is little more 
comforting, and more conducive to ignoring one’s one weaknesses, than dwelling on the 
perceived weaknesses of others.220 Diminish the differences and you diminish the comfort, and 
make self-awareness harder to avoid. 
 
7. The Policy Implications of Welfare Harmonisation: Unemployed States and 
Opportunities for the EU 
 
When the major part of the activities of the state are reorganised, the ripples are likely to spread 
far. Here two suggestions are made concerning what are perhaps less obvious consequences of 
welfare change. One deals with the reaction of national governments, and one with that of the 
institutions of the EU. 
 
The unemployed state 
 
The type change brought about by the EU is from provision to regulation,221 and the degree 
change is probably from highly confining to less confining regulation. Whether the second 
represents a decrease in employment for the state remains to be seen; a freer market may in some 
ways require closer supervision.222 However the first change clearly means less state in the 
welfare state. 
 
Perhaps more importantly than numbers of civil servants, the type of political involvement of 
government changes as it retreats from provision.223 Currently the cost of welfare services is a 
pressing political issue in most European states, and certainly those of the north-west, where 
welfare is most generous. This has been the case for most of the last two decades, and in some 
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countries for longer. One reason for this is that welfare is funded via taxes, or earmarked 
deductions from income and salary that are, for the payee, equivalent to taxes. Taxes are fixed by 
governments. The permanent problem of all governments in democracies is that the people want 
more for less.  
 
In a more market-like welfare state we may expect a smaller proportion of funds to be channelled 
via the state in this way. More payments will be made directly to insurers or institutions, or 
between them. This changes the politics of costs, and of welfare. The first object of anger at 
decreasing services or rising costs may be the institution itself. The first reaction may be to 
change provider, rather than to change government (also changing provider in a sense). A 
provider who fails to balance their books, who cannot operate within the terms set by the 
regulatory state, will be forced to withdraw from the market, either through loss of customers or 
through bankruptcy. The costs of this will perhaps be ultimately born by the populace at large, 
but less visibly so than if the state must increase taxes or runs up a debt, which it would have to 
do; it cannot realistically go bankrupt. Thus many of the day-to-day issues of welfare cost and 
policy – teaching styles, teaching quality, healthcare quality, the way patients are treated, the 
range of treatments offered (outside a basic minimum), the small print of insurance policies – 
will be removed from centralised state decision making to decentralised decision-making by 
consumers. The government won’t have to worry about these matters any more or, at least, as 
much as it used to.224 
 
Welfare policy is insular. Increasingly, states look to their neighbours to learn policy lessons.225 
Nevertheless, it is essentially an engagement with the relationships within the borders of the 
state. What happens when a government has little to do at home? Perhaps the same as happens 
when it has problems at home that it cannot solve; it looks outside, for distraction. Starting a war 
to distract from economic problems is the most dramatic and archetypal example of this. 
 
This is a speculative point, but it may be that the limited assertiveness in global affairs shown by 
European states is not just a result of innate pacifism nor only of weakness, but also because a 
government can define and occupy itself adequately without such engagement.226 To go a step 
further, governmental resources must be limited in any state, and perhaps European states simply 
cannot engage adequately with the operation of a welfare state and have the policy energy over 
for a creative role elsewhere. This is not so much a point about finance as about the capacity to 
generate and manage policy, and the capacity of the public to absorb and assess and care about it. 
If so, we may expect that the institutional instinct to preserve its own necessity will encourage 
increasing governmental extroversion. Ministers and parliamentarians who cannot make a 
difference at home will ask the cameras to follow them as they seek to make a difference abroad.  
 
To argue this convincingly would require specific empirical research. However, existing studies 
on related points suggest that the thesis is not ridiculous. It is, for example, accepted that foreign 
policy and national identity are linked, and domestically generated ideas of the role of the state 
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may have a powerful foreign policy influence.227 Thus changes in domestic identity-creating 
institutions should have some external impact. It has also been argued that functional views of 
the organs of governance will tend to undermine taboos about sovereignty and lead to more 
interventionist foreign policy; if the state is just a means to an end then interfering in other 
people’s states is easier to justify, particularly when those states function badly and we think we 
know how to make them work better.228 Finally, it should be noted that a link between the 
institutional structure of welfare states and foreign aid policies has been established.229 The 
structure of the welfare state certainly makes itself known abroad in some ways.  
 
Opportunity for the EU 
 
Markets require regulation and European markets require European regulation. As with telecoms 
and energy, the transfer of public services to the private sector results in a transfer of authority to 
Brussels. Assuming substantive welfare harmonisation remains taboo, it is nevertheless likely 
that competition-based regulation of providers will come into being. This is likely to accelerate 
and entrench the liberalisation of welfare, without determining the degree of protection that each 
state requires or guarantees. 
 
Alongside this, the creation of welfare markets creates a new beast; the consumer of welfare 
services.230 From being relatively passive recipients of public largesse, individuals move to 
taking significant control of the nature and origin of the services they receive. This opens up a 
particularly interesting avenue of opportunity for the EU, in the form of consumer protection 
law.231  
 
There is already a considerable amount of EU consumer law, applying to purchase of goods and 
certain services.232 The legal basis for this is the idea that shopping cross-border is obstructed by 
a fear of doing business in an unknown legal environment. Without a sense that basic consumer 
rights are protected, the consumer will stay at home. Hence minimum consumer protection 
standards throughout the EU, governing liability of suppliers and producers, guarantees on 
products, and unfair contract terms can be said to remove obstacles to movement and improve 
the operation of the internal market.233 
 
It is accepted that certain kinds of transactions require specific legislation. For example, time 
share contracts and contracts made with canvassers who approach their customers in public 
places are both situations where the customer is vulnerable to enthusiastic persuasion, the 
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contract may be more complex than at first seems, and there is a relatively high chance of regret. 
Targeted legislation addresses the problems that may arise.234 
 
The creation of a cross-border welfare market cries out for consumer rights.235 Firstly, the nature 
of the services involved is often intensely complex. Secondly, it is often difficult for the 
consumer to obtain full information about decisions made concerning them. Thirdly, there is a 
dramatic imbalance in expertise between provider and consumer, so that the consumer is often 
forced to, in economic terms, purchase whatever the provider tells them to purchase. Fourthly, 
these services matter. If it is important to protect purchasers of time share apartments, then how 
much more important it is to ensure that individuals are in a position to make wise decisions 
about their health care and education. Lastly, because of the importance and complexity of the 
services involved, there will be a significant inertia to shopping abroad or with a foreign provider 
operating domestically. Individuals will be disinclined to venture from known providers unless 
they feel safe doing so, and guaranteeing them certain minimum rights will be a significant step 
in achieving this. 
 
The sorts of rights that legislation might guarantee include rights to information.236 The patient 
should be able to know what is being done and why, and whether anything went wrong, and this 
information should be available immediately. That is not automatically the case in Europe, where 
explanation is often limited, and it is still relatively common practice for information to be 
withheld from patients ‘in their own good’.237 Perhaps they wouldn’t understand, or it would 
only worry them, or since the mistake seemed to have no consequences the doctor sees no need 
to mention it. Does a patient have a right to be informed if the treatment they are receiving is not 
the best possible? In many states, where expensive treatments are restricted and second-best 
drugs routinely used without any admission to the patient of this, such a right would spread panic 
throughout the healthcare system.238 Does the desire to prevent loss of faith in the state count for 
more than the individual’s interest in knowing that, if they can find the money for it, or sue their 
insurer, there is a drug which might cure them? Doesn’t Hippocrates have something to say 
about this? There are legitimate arguments for all the restrictive points of view above, but they 
nevertheless have an archaic feel. They require a degree of faith in professionals and a degree of 
subservience from their customers which is probably today regarded as obsolete.  
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There are also good arguments for the availability of non-customer-specific information; what 
are the success rates of this school – for girls, for boys, for minorities - or surgeon or procedure? 
How many individuals have been helped back to work by this scheme? Once again, the general 
level of availability of such information is extremely low, particularly in the medical sphere.  
 
Another issue is transparency.239 As far as pension schemes go, incomprehensibility seems the 
rule rather than the exception; certainly this legally trained author has never been able to 
understand what he is paying or may get back. Similarly with most forms of social insurance, 
and much medical treatment, price transparency is low. This hinders movement. For example, 
most Dutch medical insurance currently pays out-of-system providers at up to the Dutch market 
rate. Apart from the difficulty of knowing what that is, there is the difficulty of knowing how to 
superimpose that template on a different treatment and price structure abroad. 
 
Within education pricing may be simpler, but the rights of students are not clear. Much 
continental examining and marking is personal; the teacher both sets and marks the exam alone, 
without supervision. The result is dramatic differences in grading, such that the clever or cynical 
student can shop for high marks, and grades from different contexts, while formally and legally 
equivalent, are often not. There may be no easy solution to this, but are there rights of challenge 
or appeal? Mostly yes, but in widely differing ways and to differing degrees.240 Does a student 
have a right to have their paper considered anonymously (almost unknown), if they feel that their 
name, betraying sex or origin, may influence the mark? Any such proposals to create a common 
body of rights of this type would be difficult to agree because of the wide differences in norms. It 
can also be said that in a market such rights should not be necessary – the whole point is that if 
they do not like what is offered they can go elsewhere. However, this is not the European way. 
There is a strong culture of fair and uniform protection, and the pattern is to regard differences in 
rights of this sort as sand in the market machinery, which must ultimately be removed. This view 
can also be justified by the desire that qualifications and education from institutions across 
Europe be seen as of equal value and level. 
 
Two more issues are liability, and unfair contract terms, including terms restricting transferral 
between providers, likely to be an issue in social insurance, and to some extent in education, 
where the question of a legitimate minimum fee unit (the term, the year?) might be considered. 
The example of existing consumer legislation suggests that minimum European standards in such 
areas would require no new philosophy. 
 
What is interesting about the possibility of such welfare consumer legislation is that it may not 
be as difficult to achieve as substantive harmonisation. It implies that national structures are left 
intact, and the individual is assisted in migration between them. The political obstacles may 
therefore be lower. Indeed a first step in this direction may be found in the new services 
directive, which includes a section on the rights of recipients of cross-border services.241 Those 
rights are centred on issues of transparency and information, as suggested above. The idea of 
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protection for the consumer in the European services market is accepted, and a step towards 
specifically welfare-targeted legislation would seem an ideologically small one. Yet further 
thought suggests that perhaps it should be taken more seriously. The line between welfare 
services and the terms on which they are provided is not a clear one, and the result of consumer 
legislation may be harmonising effects on the services themselves. 
 
From the side of the consumer, it is an artificial division. All the terms of the relationship 
between the parties are part of a single package. More importantly, from the side of the provider, 
while the distinction may make more sense, the two elements influence each other. Rights to 
transferability, information, and liability and contractual limitations, will influence the 
economics and marketability of particular types of service. One may expect providers to adapt 
their substantive offerings in the light of the terms on which they must offer them. Examples 
might include a wider range of treatments, if patients must be informed of all the possibilities, or 
a wider range of courses if students have the right to take credits at other institutions, or a 
narrowing of the range of social insurance possibilities in the light of the costs of transferral 
between providers. Thus if the EU becomes the market regulator of a welfare market this will 
entail a degree of indirect substantive welfare harmonisation.242  
 
It will also bring the EU to the heart of national politics. This could have consequences for 
broader integration. If the liberalisation of welfare is seen as a failure, undermining social values, 
then the more closely it is associated with the EU, the greater the political backlash. If the 
Commission has become an assertive intervener in national markets, as is the case with energy or 
telecoms or, increasingly, financial services, ensuring cross-border competition, then the anti-
European animosity aroused is likely to dwarf anything yet seen. There is nothing that arouses 
such passion in Europe as threatening societal security. 
 
Yet if welfare levels survive liberalisation, and individuals become accustomed and even 
attached to their new freedom of choice, and accept the welfare market, then there is political 
capital to be earned from involvement. The EU, provider of consumer rights, may then be the 
protector of the individual in these important transactions, and just as it attracts significant 
political support for its interventions in other consumer areas, in non-discrimination, and in 
environmental regulation, it may come also to be seen as the friend of welfare rights for all. The 
potential political credit to be earned is probably as great as the downside risks are. 
 
The EU has struggled for some time to find a path to the citizen’s heart. It lacks cuddliness. It is 
valued in the areas mentioned above, but these are none of them central political issues. Welfare 
is. If welfare users felt the same way about the EU and the Commission as environmentalists, 
labour lawyers, or consumer groups do (not perfect, but a powerful force broadly in the right 
directions, and on the whole better than national governments), its position in the state-EU-
citizen troika would truly be changed.  
 
                                                 
242 See Bernard ‘Between a Rock and a Soft Place: Internal Market versus Open Coordination in EU Social Welfare 
Law’ in Dougan and Spaventa, n 9 above, at 273, on the line between rights and substance in the welfare context. 
  59 
Popularity can be leveraged. Overcoming suspicion and attracting praise makes the next step in 
integration much easier.243 Playing with welfare is playing with security and home affairs, with a 
common foreign policy, and with wider political integration too. 
 
Long term harmonisation 
 
In the longer term opportunities arise for substantive harmonisation. The market itself will 
achieve a form of this. As trans-European educational, healthcare and insurance providers come 
into being, it will be possible to have the same welfare services and protection in Poland and 
Cyprus as in Denmark. In the former countries they may be above the state-guaranteed 
minimum, and they may be only available to those who can afford them, but the removal of 
borders to cross-border welfare will at least make them available. It is not unlikely that many 
will choose to pay more to get more. In reality, therefore, the welfare services that individuals 
receive will become a great deal more similar across Europe, just as globalisation homogenises 
markets for more traditional products.  
 
The more this happens, the easier it is politically to create EU legislation, and, in particular, the 
easier it gets for Member States to talk about substantive welfare on a European scale. Should 
there be common minimum standards for insurance, as there are for banks, for food, for many 
products? Now that mobility is already harmonising the substance of university education, 
should we begin to talk about what happens in schools?  
 
Finally, negative harmonisation alone creates apparent economic imbalances. Institutions 
compete with each other under different regulatory frameworks, and as winners and losers 
emerge so do calls for substantive harmonisation. Whether justified or not, the perception of 
difference as unfairness creates a powerful lobby for a ‘level playing field’. States opposed to 
harmonisation in a pre-movement period may find the political balance changes when cross-
border services have actually begun undermining national institutions. Harmonisation once seen 
as a threat to national institutions may now seem to protect them. 244 
 
Thus the exuberant phase of liberalisation may be a transient one. Knocking down national walls 
may turn out in the long term to be less about creating a new market landscape than about 
preparing the ground for a new, albeit less substantial, European house. Free movement and 
competition may diminish the state’s role in welfare only to see part of it reclaimed later by the 
EU.  
 
Soft co-ordination assists this process. The trend of recent years has been to semi-formalise an 
ongoing conversation between states about policy matters, in the ‘open method of co-
ordination’.245 This encourages them to learn from each other, and at least to some extent 
stimulates a process of natural convergence. Insofar as such convergence reduces the problems 
resulting from different systems the OMC can be seen as an alternative to positive 
                                                 
243 De Swaan, n 202 above, on the historical use of welfare protection by central bodies to overcome the power of 
local elites. 
244 Davies ‘Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonisation?’ n 101 above. 
245 On the OMC and welfare see Zeitlin, in De Burca, n 2 above; Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model’ n 143 
above; Cohen and Sabel, n 182 above; Bernard, n 40 above. 
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harmonisation, and is likely to reduce the contexts where negative harmonisation occurs. It is a 
third way. However, it seems likely that reducing some differences will magnify the importance 
of remaining ones, and that ultimately a purely voluntary convergence will be regarded as too 
insecure by Member States and free movers whose rights and freedoms depend on a certain 
stable harmony between systems. Moreover, once convergence is significant the national 
uniqueness that was fought for becomes less apparent and motives to resist harmonisation are 
less. Hence the importance of the OMC in the longer term is likely to be as a preparation for 
positive harmonisation.246 Given that, the extension of the OMC to welfare-related issues is an 
important step. Alongside that, it should be noted that national bureaucracies often have formal 
or less formal contacts with each other in an attempt to deal with the practical issues of free 
movement and avoid them becoming legal fights. This day-to-day peer learning and 
communication may not hit the academic headlines but it can be seen as a deepening and 
broadening of the OMC philosophy, and so likely to increase its effects. 
 
8. The Economic Consequences of Welfare Harmonisation: An Emerging Global Industry 
 
The United States is unique in the degree of its commitment to individual self-reliance, its social 
model, and its limited view of the state.247 Most of the rest of the world is closer to Europe in its 
view of the ideal nation, and would tend to consider universal welfare services, with some degree 
of equality, a state priority. Many nations are not in a position to achieve this yet, but a growing 
number are, particularly in Asia and South America. 
 
Health, education, and social insurance, if considered as industries, would dwarf all others. 
Healthcare alone typically consumes around 10% of a nation’s GDP. 248Social insurance can be 
even more. 249 Providing these services on a basis of universality and equality is likely to involve 
particular organisational and administrative expertise. Just as with any industry, possession of 
experience in an area is an export opportunity. 
 
European providers should be in a position to market their organisational capacities around the 
world. They would not primarily be selling medical or educational skills, which are more 
widespread, but the creation of systems, mechanisms whereby all citizens can be included in 
welfare, and the necessary subsidy can be facilitated while keeping the financial role of the state 
to a minimum; attractive for countries developing new welfare states.  
 
                                                 
246 S.Velluti, The European Employment Strategy and Enlargement in T.Tridimas and P.Nebbia (eds), European law 
for the twenty-first century - Rethinking the new legal order, volume1, (Hart Publishing, 2004); D.Trubek and 
L.Trubek ‘Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-Ordination’ 
(2005) 11:3 European Law Journal 343; D.Trubek, P.Cottrell, and M.Nance., “Soft law”, “Hard Law”, and 
European integration: Toward a theory of Hybridity, http://www.wisc.edu/wage/pubs/papers. 
247 Although one should not overstate the differences: See Marmor, Mashaw and Harvey America’s Misunderstood 
Welfare State (Basic Books, 1992). 
248 Statistics are available at www.worldbank.com, http://hdr.undp.org, and www.oecd.org. EU Member States 
appear to spend (public spending only) around 5-7 % of GDP on education, around 7-9% of GDP on health, and 
around 15-30% of GDP on ‘welfare’ broadly interpreted. See also the figures in Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes 
‘The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy’, Report for the Portuguese 
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The providers would also be offering capital. Any welfare system must ultimately be self-
financing, but will require initial funds to create the infrastructure. For the government of an 
emerging economy, wishing to extend welfare to its citizens while maintaining high growth such 
capital may be hard to come by. However unusual such a process may be historically it does not 
seem unlikely that partnership with a foreign firm who is able to cover or share costs – in return 
for sharing profits – would be an attractive option. Providers who occupy a significant part of the 
European market for welfare would be very large organisations, capable of raising considerable 
amounts of money. They would be in a position to significantly assist welfare growth elsewhere 
in the world. 
 
Education is likely to be the most resisted market. 250 States will not welcome interference in this 
sensitive element of national composition. However, at the higher technical level this may not be 
so; the provision of technical training institutions can be seen as an extension of the co-operation 
and partnership between western and other establishments which is already widespread. Health 
care may be the easiest to enter. It is often the most commercial aspect of welfare. A smart 
government may welcome foreign healthcare providers on condition that they build their 
infrastructure not only in the rich cities but also in the countryside, and that they provide services 
on equitable terms.251 
 
Ultimately it is social insurance which holds a welfare state together,252 and which is potentially 
the biggest market of all. The capacity of individuals to obtain other services can be guaranteed 
by providing them with insurance, and a state could once again welcome deep-pocketed foreign 
insurance organisations but insist that they offer on terms of universality – as is the case in 
Europe, and as European providers will know how to do profitably. 
 
Relatively little of the above is happening, partly because the welfare providers are not outward 
looking. Their goals and vision are internal to their home states. The actors barely exist, in 
Europe at least, who are interested in spreading their skills as far as possible and conquering new 
markets. Yet there are signs of change. The universities are the avante-garde here, with an 
increasing number of western, predominantly American but also European, ones opening 
campuses in Asia.253 There are also foreign-run hospitals, and Asian non-welfare insurance 
markets are increasingly being targeted by foreign insurers.254 The important step will come 
when medical and long-term sickness insurance are added to the list. Then the release of welfare 
from national boundaries may echo beyond the EU, and whatever strength is gained and lessons 
are learned from cross-border European provision may gain its greatest significance as a 
preparation for the spread of welfare round the globe. 
                                                 
250 See Handoll, n 203 above; Moschonos, n 1 above. 
251 On the issues see Drechsler and Jutting ‘Private Health Insurance for the Poor in Developing Countries’(OECD 
development centre, Policy Insights no.11, 2005), available from www.oecd.org; Bennett McPake and Mills (eds) 
Private Health Providers in Developing Countries: Serving the Public Interest? (Zed Book,s 1997); Leonard 
Africa’s Changing Markets for Health and Veterinary Services, the New Institutional Issues (Macmillan, 2000); 
Vogel Financing Health Care in Sub-Saharan Africa (Greenwood Press, 1993); Newbrander Private Health Sector 
Growth in Asia (Wiley, 1997); Wieners (ed) Global Health Care Markets (Jossey-Bass, 2001). 
252 See Newbrander, ibid, at 21. 
253 See Ho Mok ‘Privatization or Marketization: Educational Development in Post-Mao China’ (1997) 43 
International Review of Education 547. 
254 Chu ‘The Making of Imminent Insurance Markets in Asia’ Best’s Review, April 2001. 




It’s not about levels of welfare. States can still regulate and use taxation to ensure universal 
coverage. It’s about institutions and borders. Provision is being fragmented and de-nationalised. 
It remains to see how far this will go, but the trend is for Member States to encourage the process 
by themselves stimulating more diversity and freedom of provision, and so creating a proto-
market which EU law then takes further. Looking at the law as it stands, its consistency, and its 
roots in principles without which the EU becomes meaningless, it seems likely that a significant 
deconstruction of welfare monoliths will take place. 
 
Is this move, which can be broadly described as from provision to regulation, a socially neutral 
one? After all, it is being done primarily in an economic cause, with derogations serving to 
protect social aims. That would suggest that there is no aim to transform society, but rather to 
preserve it while transforming economic structures. 
 
One challenge is to equality. Universality is relatively easy to achieve, but maintaining equality 
of welfare services in a borderless market will demand a lot from regulators. They will need to 
make a commitment to an ongoing management of markets which recognises the virtues of 
allowing liberty of provision, but is not afraid to steer and constrain it in the name of other goals. 
EU law allows exceptions to market principles, and states will have to meet the challenge of 
arguing their case well instead of flaunting national choices as if these were the last word, and so 
inviting judicial rebuke. The corporate welfare states of Northern Europe have islands of 
surprising competitiveness already, and indicate that some kind of balance is possible. They 
achieve this by an intense democratic and consultative process, and are able to maintain it 
because of widespread public support for precisely that idea of balance between public and 
private, individual and collective. 
 
Creating such a balance demands a more complete social vision than running a state monopoly 
does. Instead of imposing uniformity, a simple but lumpen form of fairness, states have to think 
what services and support are necessary to enable all individuals to actively participate in a 
diverse society, and negotiate the choices it presents them with. Rather than achieving equality 
by controlling delivery of the end-goods, the objects of state policy become the consumers of the 
goods, and the responsibility of the state is to mould them so that they are able to make their own 
way, with a sufficient absence of failure that one can still speak of an equal or fair society. The 
state in a welfare market may be institutionally less present, but its demands and constraints may 
become – paradoxically? - more intrusive.255 Is this a distant echo of the United States, where a 
famously free and comprehensive market is combined with strict and moralistic laws? Freedom 
entails responsibility – or it contains its own limits. 
 
The broader challenge is to national identity. Can there be culture, in the sense of a shared way 
of life, without institutions? Law is an impoverished replacement as a binding factor. It has no 
hinterland, and offers no place for contribution or participation, for exchange between citizens. 
To share norms may have some value, but is about common limits, rather than common 
activities. It is participating in common institutions which creates a sense of shared life. 
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If culture is to survive it will then take place increasingly outside the state. In locality, religion, 
politics, ideology, profession, income, people will look for a sense of community and shared 
experience. Such a decentralisation and diversification may bring with it a great deal of vibrancy 
and creativity, but is there anything left over that one could call the nation-state, beyond a 
skeleton of emergency services, policing and war-making – functions that take place around and 
between the fabric of daily existence, whose very aim is to provide a bubble within which that 
existence can continue undisturbed? 
 
To many Europeans such a fragmentation and Americanisation of their lives will be an alarming 
prospect. It can also be seen as a confrontation with reality – if the sense of belonging to Europe 
and its nations is no more than a governmental construct then should we care about losing it? 
Isn’t there a widespread belief that there is some deeper fund of shared values, attitudes, 
attachments, sentiments, which defines and binds us? Are we going to find out that this is a 
myth, or something so shallow and fragile that it dissolves under the homogenising power of 
liberty? Is the enemy then the liberty, or the dishonest belief in our special-ness which a lack of 
the chance to be otherwise has allowed to survive? 
 
Perhaps the most authentically European aspect of this situation is the combination of beliefs: 
one the one hand, that Europe has some deep attachment to solidarity, some way of life and 
collective morality which is both good and distinctive, and on the other hand, a sense of how 
delicate such things are, how they can be simultaneously valued by the population and destroyed 
in a moment by institutional or social change. Is there a contradiction here, some self-deception 
about the depth of the values, or is political and social maturity a better description? Is it 
precisely a sense of the selfishness and weakness of individuals that makes them care about 
systems to overcome these evils? This is not the state as an, American-style, reflection of the 
people, but the state as a necessary counterpoint to them. It does not see human beings as 
fundamentally good, but as fundamentally complicated. 
 
Liberalising welfare will be revealing. It is easy to imagine that accustomed to choice and 
independence we may become more resentful of subsidising others. Knowing that a few 
thousand more euros would buy a place at that top college may test our preparedness to pay 
towards the college education of others. Accustomed to medical treatment in an attractive centre 
with People Like Us, we may come to feel much less responsibility for what happens in the other 
hospital on the other side of town. Knowing that our employer has arranged a pension exceeding 
minimum standards and has provided us with certain contractual guarantees, may make the 
question of what those minimum standards should be somewhat less pressing. If we receive the 
same and standard service as the state defines and provides for all, then our interest in making it 
a good one is far more direct. Will the political will to a ‘social’ state survive the loss of 
uniformity? 
 
It is the first time that Europe has had to face these questions. It built up its welfare states in a 
situation of authentic crisis. On the continent the risk of chaos and truly devastating poverty was 
close, while in the UK there was a need to integrate and neutralise the social threat presented by 
potentially unemployed and traumatised returning soldiers. By the time the crisis was over, the 
welfare state had become taboo, not just in broad principle but in its institutions. No politician 
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dared to tamper with the structures that had been safety nets for millions. For voters, passionate 
support for these institutions was hardly surprising while no alternatives were available. No-one 
burns their clothes until they have a new suit. The consequence is that the European belief in 
solidarity is hardly tested. The present welfare state is a gift from history, more than a conscious 
choice by the Europeans of today. 
 
I tend to think that this is the most interesting and important aspect of welfare reform. In a 
continent not without sanctimony, it provides us with a chance at self-discovery. Do we really 
care about each other as much as we like to say? People make institutions, but institutions also 
make people, and remaking those institutions may reveal how many of our values are really 
rooted in something more permanent and psychologically deeper than the activities of 
government. Has our history taught us a social conscience so well that we cannot forget it, or 
have we just not had the chance at that forgetting? There is on the one hand the fear proclaimed 
in the newspapers, the parliaments, and the demonstrations, that the market will conquer our 
principles, and ravish our systems. There is on the other hand the unexpressed fear that lives 
between the lines, the deeper one; that we will surrender them willingly. Are we, the people of 
Europe, truly the possessors of some defining instinct to solidarity or, once released from 
compulsion, will we turn out no different in behaviour and values from those to whom we like to 
compare ourselves? Are we, to use the language of Europe’s panic, Americans?   
